University of Miami Law School

University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles

Faculty and Deans

2003

Children's Rights in Israel: An End to Corporal Punishment
Tamar Ezer

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Children's Rights in Israel: An End to
Corporal Punishment?
By Tamar Ezer*
1. Introduction: The Plonit Decision
On January 25, 2000, the Supreme Court of Israel issued
the landmark Plonit' decision, which prohibited the use of
corporal punishment as an educational tool by parents. In this
case, the Court rejected an appeal by a mother, convicted of
assault and abuse for slapping and striking her two minor
children with shoes and a vacuum cleaner. The mother denied
that her actions constituted abuse and further excused them as
"disciplinary measures" imposed on her children "in order to
educate and improve them."2 The Court both declared the
mother's actions abusive and rejected the parental defense for
corporal punishment. Maintaining that "corporal punishment as
an educational method not only fails to achieve its goals, but
also causes physical and psychological damage to the child, that
is liable to leave its mark on him even in maturity," the Court
proclaimed a strict policy against the physical punishment of
children and imposed a duty of protection upon the state. 3
While carving out a narrow exception permitting the use of
force to prevent injury to children or others,4 the Court held that
J.D. Harvard Law School, 2001; Editor-in-Chief of the Harvard Human
Rights Journal, 2001; B.A. Stanford University, 1997; Clerkship with Justice
Dorit Beinisch at the Supreme Court of Israel, 2001-2002.
*

'Plonit is used in Hebrew to keep a female party's name anonymous and
safeguard her privacy, similar to Jane Roe in English. Throughout this
paper, I will thus refer to the Supreme Court case as the Plonit decision.
Cr.A. 4596/98, Roe v. State of Israel, 54(l) P.D..145.
2 Cr.A. 4596/98, Roe v. State of Israel, 54(I) P.D. 145.
' Id. at 170.
4The Court differentiates between the use of force for "educational
punishment," which is "void and forbidden" and the "reasonable use of force
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"corporal punishment of children, or humiliation and the
derogation from their dignity as a method of education by their
parents, is entirely impermissible." 5 This decision caused a
splash in the media and sparked debates on proper methods of
child-rearing, both amongst secular child specialists and within
the religious community. It was highly controversial for three
reasons. First, it calls for state intrusion into family privacy.
Second, it gives children's right to be free from violence the
constitutional status of a basic right. Third, it appears to draw a
distinction between the norm-setting role of law and
enforcement.
A. State Intrusion
The Plonit decision calls for state intrusion into the
''sacrosanct" privacy of the family home and close regulation of
parent-child relations. In Plonit, the Court asserted, "The law
imposes an obligation on state authorities to intervene in the
family unit and to T rotect the child when necessary, including
from his parents." This is the case since the state has an7
"obligation to protect those that cannot defend themselves."
Furthermore, the child is not an incomplete entity to be
subsumed by the family. Rather, "in our society the child is an
autonomous person, possessing his own independent interests
and rights" that the state must safeguard. 8 The state thus has an
independent responsibility to each child. The Court emphasized9
that "even a little person, has all the rights of a big person,"
upholding the "basic right of the children in our society to
dignity, bodily integrity, and health of mind."' 0
to prevent injury to the child or to others" or "to preserve order." Cr.A.

4596/98, Roe v. State of Israel, 54(I) P.D. 145, 182. For instance, a parent
can use force to prevent a child from running into the street.
5 Cr.A. 4596/98, Roe v. State of Israel, 54(l) P.D. 145, 180.
6 Id at 176.

SId.

8

Id. at 178.

91d.

10°Id
.
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The Court recognized parents' rights, but stated that they
are subordinate to the rights of children. As it explained, the
"rights of parents to raise and educate their children are not
absolute. The relative nature of these rights is expressed in the
obligation of parents to care for the child, his best interests, and
rights." I Although the decision calls the right of parents to
control their children's upbringing "a natural right," 12 the Court
emphasized that this right can be forfeited. Since the "child is
not its parents' property . . . [w]hen a parent does not properly
fulfill his obligations, abuses his discretion or parental authority
in a manner which endangers or harms the child, the state will
intervene and protect the child." 13 Thus, "parental discretion is
limited and always subject
to the needs of the child, to his
' 4
welfare, and to his rights."'
The Court's approach appears radical since it contradicts
the common law individual liberty tradition, where courts
attempt to maintain a public/private distinction and are reluctant
to allow the state to pierce family privacy. In fact, the Israeli
Court has taken the opposite approach from that of England and
many states in the United States, which have gone so far as to
statutorily protect the parent's right to employ physical
punishments that are "reasonable" and for the purpose of either
education or discipline. However, even in England and the
United States, the public/private divide has begun to weaken
with the recognition of women's rights, requiring the state to
deal with domestic violence and violations within the family.
The recognition of children's rights is perhaps the next stage in
this dissolution.
The Israeli Court tied violations of individual human
rights caused by corporal punishment to social harms. It
cautioned, "We must... take into account that we are living in
a society where violence is spreading like a plague; a permit for
'minor' violence is likely to deteriorate into very serious
''Id.at 176.
2 id. at

175.
'3Id. at 176.
14Id.
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violence."' 15 Thus, not only does "employing punishment that
causes pain and humiliation" violate the child's "rights as a
human being," but "it distances us from our aspiration to be a
society free of violence."' 16 In this way, the Court shattered the
private/public distinction, revealing a "private" violation within
the home and family to be a matter for public concern and
government interference.
B. Fundamental Right to Be Free of Violence
The Plonit decision was controversial because not only
did it recognize children's right to be free of all violence, even
the "educational" kind, but it also endowed this right with a
constitutional status. Starting in 1979, various Scandinavian
countries had already rejected the use of physical discipline, but17
this prohibition was legislated, not proclaimed by the court.
By contrast, Israel's prohibition is similar to that of Italy's coming from the country's Supreme Court. Since Israeli
legislation does not criminalize physical discipline, the Court
supported its decision by referring to both the 1992 Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty'" and the International Convention
on the Rights of the Child. 19 Even though Israel does not have
an official constitution, its Basic Laws create a constitution by
piecemeal, and a Basic Law can trump legislation. Citing the
Basic Law and international principles thus elevated the
decision to a constitutional level, making the matter one of
fundamental rights. As the Court explained, the Basic Law:

'

5

Id. at 181.

180.
17 John E. Dun-ant, Evaluating the Success of Sweden's Corporal

16 Id. at

Punishment Ban, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 435 (1999).
"8Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391.
'9 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess. 61st mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (1989) [hereinafter

CRC].
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Human Dignity and Liberty "raises 2the
status of human dignity
0
to a super-legal constitutional rank.",
C. Norm-Setting and Enforcement of the Law
The decision seems to differentiate between the normsetting function and enforcement of law. While it takes a hard
line, virtually abolishing the corporal punishment of children, it
nevertheless counsels prosecutorial restraint.
The Court
stressed, "the criminal law includes enough 'filters,' ensuring
that petty cases will not be included in its sweep."2'1 First, "the
prosecution has discretion not to go to trial in the absence of the
public interest." 22 Moreover, "the criminal law contains the 'de
minimis' defense, which may also be used to prevent the
imposition of criminal liability for the use of mild force." 23 The
Court thus reassured that "acts which an ordinarily constituted
individual would not complain about" and "routine physical
contact between a parent and child" will not serve as a basis for
criminal liability. 4 This brings up the question of how
judgments weeding out the trivial cases will be made. Is this a
recipe for discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement? But,
perhaps these same concerns are implicated with all laws, as
most pertinently, with the prohibition on assaults against adults.
Here, however, the Court was explicit about the impossibility
and even undesirability of complete enforcement. The Court
emphasized its role in shaping citizens' internal concepts of
right and wrong and not just the external laws regulating
behavior, backed by the might of the state.
As is customary, the Plonit case was decided by a panel
of three judges. Justice Dorit Beinisch wrote the decision, in
which she both defined ab6se and declared that "no corporal
20

Cr.A. 4596/98, Roe v. State of Israel, 54(I) P.D. 145, 179.

21

Id. at 182.

22 Id.
23 id.
24 id.
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punishment is permitted., 25 Justice Aharon Barak concurred
with Justice Beinisch's opinion without further comment.
Justice Yitzhak Englard wrote a partial dissent in which he took
issue with Justice Beinisch's characterization of abuse, but did
not address the Court's rejection of all corporal punishment.
However, he joined the other 2justices in condemning the
mother's actions as an assault.
He stated, "[Tlhe violent
manner in which the mother punished her children
was neither
27
reasonable nor can be defined as de minimis.'

This paper aims at an exploration of three issues. Part I
places the Plonit decision within both the Israeli and
international context, and it examines the legal, political, and
social climate that made this decision possible. Part I1focuses
on enforcement of the decision. To get a sense of the
immediate legal impact of the Plonit case, I analyze the legal
opinions citing it. Interviews with the various children's rights
organizations in Israel and with the government agencies in
charge of law enforcement further provide insight into Plonil's
enforcement. Part III looks at the reception of the Plonit
decision, focusing on the views of experts and concerns it raised
amongst the public. This portion of the paper aims to
investigate the impact of the Plonit decision on the cultural
discourse that, in turn, shapes the legal environment.
II. Context
A. The Israeli Legal System
An understanding of the Israeli legal system is necessary
in order to place the Plonit decision in proper context. What
2

1Id. at 181.
mother in this case claimed that she acted for the good of her children.

26 The

She did not express remorse for her behavior and would not commit that she
will stop hitting her children if it seems necessary for her to do so. Cr.A.
4596/98, Roe v. State of Israel, 54(l) P.D. 145, 184 (Englard, J., dissenting).
27 Cr.A. 4596/98, Roe v. State of Israel, 54(l) P.D. 145, 184 (Englard, J.,
dissenting).
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was the legal, political, and social climate in Israel that made
this decision possible? In this section, I will provide some basic
background to the functioning of the Israeli legal system, the
role of the court, and the role of government in defining the
status of the child and the family. This will enable exploration
of questions of democratic legitimacy and relations between the
state and its citizens.
1. General Framework
Until the end of World War I, Israel was part of the
Ottoman Empire and governed by the Mejelle, the Ottoman
code influenced by Islam and modeled after Napoleon's Code
Civile. Most of this Ottoman heritage is of no practical
significance today. However, Israel's Admiralty and Civil
Procedure contain portions of Ottoman Law, and the Ottomans
shaped the current structure of religious courts regulating
personal status issues, such as marriage, divorce, custody, and
inheritance. 28 In 1922, Turkish rule was followed by the British
Mandate until establishment of the State of Israel on May 14,
1948.29 British legislation still in effect at this time was
incorporated into Israel's law. (Section 11 of the Law and
Administrative Ordinance), and much of it survives today in
revised form. 30
The Israeli Supreme Court consists of twelve permanent
justices and additional acting ones, who serve until the age of
seventy. Currently, there are fourteen justices on the court.
Cases are normally presented in front of ad hoc panels of three
judges, randomly chosen by the President of the Court. 3 1 A
28

Yoram Shachar, History and Sources of Israeli Law, in INTRODUCTION

TO

LAW OF ISRAEL I, 3 (Amos Shapira & Karen C. DeWitt-Arar eds. 1995);
ARIEL BIN-NUN, THE LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 4-7 (1992); Stephen

THE

Goldstein, Multiculturalism, Parental Choice and Traditional Values: A
Comment on Religious Education in ISrael, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND
TRADITIONAL VALUES 118, 119-20 (1998).
29

ARIEL BIN-NUN, THE LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 4 (1992).

30 Shachar, supra note 28, at 8.
"' Id. at 9.
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decision by the three-judge bench may be subject to rehearing
by five or more judges of the Supreme Court if the decision
deviates from a previous rule or deals with a question of
particular importance.32
The Supreme Court has played a fundamental role in the
development of public law, regulating relations between
citizens and the state, and in the protection of individual rights.
Until 1992, the Supreme Court did not have the power to strike
down legislation, but it could subject administrative action to
full judicial review under its Bagatz function. Bagatz procedure
allows direct access to the Supreme Court to any individual
aggrieved by the State, regardless of the economic weight or
legal significance of the infringement. In this capacity, the
Supreme Court acts as a high court of justice, reviewing the
administrative activities of the other branches of government
and protecting individual rights. 33 As Israel has not yet adopted
a formal constitution, the development of rights doctrine
has
34
been a common law function undertaken by the courts.
Although Israel does not have an official constitution,
the Israeli Knesset is creating a piecemeal constitution through
the passage of Basic Laws to be eventually pulled together into
an integrated whole. 35 Although theoretically a Basic Law has
BIN-NuN, supra note 28, at 201-02.
33Now, in order to lighten the load of the Supreme Court, administrative
departments in the district courts take care of simpler legal cases. The
Supreme Court has judicial review over the cases decided by these
administrative departments. Law for Administrative Courts (2000). At
times, this is an appeal as of right and, at times, it requires the granting of
Supreme Court permission at http://www.leetlaw.com/files/intl9.htm (last
visited Apr. 25, 2003).
32

14David Kretzmer, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF

ISRAEL 39, 45 (Amos Shapira & Karen C. DeWitt-Arar eds. 1995). "In a
long line of decisions, beginning with... Kol Ha 'anv. Minister of Interior
[H.C. 73/53, Kol Ha'am v. Minister of Interior, 7(2) P.D. 871 (1953)], the
Supreme Court has held that because Israel is a democracy, basic civil rights
as accepted in other democracies are part and parcel of the Israeli legal
si'stem." Id.
3 According to the Harrari Resolution, "The first Knesset charges the
Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Committee with the duty of
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no greater permanence than any other law and can be altered by
a majority of the Knesset, a Basic Law has the power to trump
legislation. 36 While the first nine Basic Laws passed by the
Knesset are mainly structural, defining the branches of
government, the Knesset enacted two Basic Laws in 1992 that
deal with human rights. These are the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and37 Liberty and the Basic Law:
Freedom of
Occupation.
The Supreme Court has interpreted these two new Basic
Laws as opening the way for judicial review of legislation, and
Supreme Court President Aharon Barak heralded their passage
as a "constitutional revolution." 38 Justice Barak proudly
declared, "Similar to the United States, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, and other western countries, we now
have a constitutional defense for Human Rights. We too have
the central chapter in any written constitution, the subjectmatter of which is Human Rights . . . we too have judicial
review of statutes which unlawfully
infringe upon
39
rights."
human
protected
constitutionally
preparing a draft constitution for the State. The constitution

shall be

composed of individual chapters, in such a manner that each of them shall
constitute a basic law in itself. The individual chapters shall be brought
before the Knesset as the Committee completes its work, and the chapters
together will form the state constitution." At

http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng-mimshalhoka.htm/4.

BIN-NUN, supra note 28, at 38. Thus far, the Supreme Court has twice
used the power of a Basic Law to strike down legislation.
37 Gal Dor, Constitutional Dialogues in Action: Canadian and Israeli
Experiences in Comparative Perspective, I I IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. I,
3 (2000); Ran Hirschl, Israel's 'Constitutional Revolution'" The Legal
Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging Neo-Liberal
Economic Order, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 427, 428 (1998).
3 Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalism of the Israeli Legal System as a
Result of the Basic Lm's and its Effect on Procedural and Substantive
Criminal Lav, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 3, 3 (1997).
39 Hirschl, supra note 37, at 430-31 (quoting Aharon Barak, The
Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as a Result of the Basic
Laws and its Effect on Procedural and Substantive CriminalLaw," 31
ISRAEL L. REV. 3-21 (1997)).
36
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Although the rights protected in the two Basic Laws are
phrased in absolute terms, they each contain a limitation clause,
providing that the right may not be violated "except by a statute
that befits the values of the State of Israel, for a worthy goal,
and not exceeding what is necessary." 40 Thus, the Basic Laws
themselves recognize the protection of rights as a balancing act
that at times calls for their infringement in order to preserve the
state and social structure upon which they are premised. The
Court thus tests rights violations with a two-tiered analysis,
similar to that employed by Canadian courts under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. First, the court
examines whether a statute infringes on a basic right,
interpreting both the constitutional text and the statute. 41 Here,
the burden of proving all the elements of a breach rests on the
person asserting it. If there is an infringement, the court moves
on to the second stage and must decide whether it fulfills the
requirements of the limitation clause. At this point, the burden
of proof shifts42 to the government seeking to support the
challenged law.
The Plonit decision is based largely on the Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty. This law states the following:
The fundamental rights of a person in Israel
are grounded on the recognition of the value
of human beings, on the sanctity of life and
of their freedom, and they will be honored in
the spirit of the principles set out in the
Declaration of the Establishment of the State
of Israel. The object of this Basic Law is to
protect human dignity and freedom, in order
to entrench the values of the State of Israel
as a Jewish and democratic State in a Basic
40 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, Provision 8 1992, S.H. 1391;

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1994, S.H. 1454.
41"The courts must choose an interpretation of a statutory provision that
furthers protection of basic rights." Kretzmer, supra note 34, at 51.
42 Barak, supra note 38, at 9-10.
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Law. No injury may be caused to the life,
person or dignity of a human being as a
human being. Every person has the right to
of his life, his person and his
protection
43
dignity.
The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty has been
interpreted to protect a number of fundamental rights: the right
to life, bodily integrity, privacy and personal confidentiality,
property, liberty against arrest and imprisonment, and liberty to
enter and leave the country." According to Justice Barak, the
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty contains both a
prohibition on violation and an obligation of protection to
ensure the "minimal promise of a humane material and spiritual
existence." 45 However, Justice Barak explicitly noted that
"social human rights such as the right to education, to health
care, and to social welfare are, of course, very important rights,
' 6
but they are not, so it seems, part of 'human dignity. A
Although the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is subject
to the limitation clause, the Supreme Court has interpreted
dignity as a top value that cannot be sacrificed for other values
and its limitations themselves must be based on human
dignity .47
2. Status of the Child

a. Statistics

43 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391.
44 Kretzmer, supranote 34, at 53.
45 Aharon Barak, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right, 41 HA'PRAKLIT

271,273,280 (1994).

Hirschl, supra note 39, at 444 (quoting AHARON BARAK, LEGAL
INTERPRETATION (1994), Part III, 419 [Hebrew, Hirschl's translation]).
41 Barak, supra note 45, at 275, 278.
46
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At the close of 1999, Israel's children numbered
2,108,100, comprising 34% of the general population.4 8 As of
1996, Jewish children accounted for 74% of the population of
children in Israel. 49 Between 1998 and 1999, the number of
violent crimes committed in Israel against minors within
families rose by nearly 300 to total of 1,817 per year.5" In 2000,
WIZO shelters for battered women registered a 50% increase in
the number
of abused children in their care during the past
5
year. 1
b. Legal Status
Despite the rise in violence against children, Israel is
generally known as a child-centered country.5 2 In 1991, Israel
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and in 1996,
it ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. 53 Israeli law adheres to the child's best
interests as the governing principle
with regard to the child's
54
education.
and
supervision,
care,
Although Israeli law holds that the child's best interests
will normally be met under the parents' care, parental authority
48 ISRAEL NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE CHILD IN COLLABORATION WITH
ASHALIM, THE STATE OF THE CHILD IN ISRAEL:

A STATISTICAL ABSTRACT

5 (2000). At http://www.iyfnet.org/docunient.cfm/70/section/337 (last
visited Apr. 25, 2003).
49

GALIA EFRAT ET AL., BERNARD VAN LEER FOUND., YOUNG CHILDREN IN

ISRAEL:

A

COUNrRY STIUDY

69 in THE

STATE OF THE CHILD IN ISRAEL

(National Council for the Child 1998).
5oFrimet Roth, The Nightmare Season, THE JERUSALEM PosT, July 3, 2000,
available at http://www.nospank.net/israel2.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2003).
"lid.
52

EFRAT ET AL.,

supra note 49.

53Leslie Sebba & Varda Shiffer, Traditionand tke Right to Education: The
Case of the Ultra-Orthodox Community in Israel, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
AND TRADITIONAL VALUES 177-78 (Gillian Douglas & Leslie Sebba eds.,

1998).
' Ariel Rosen-Zvi, Family and Inheritance Law, in INTRODUCTION TO TI IE

LAW OF ISRAEL 99 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995).
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is not absolute. As far back as the 1950s, the Israeli Supreme
Court acknowledged limits to parental authority and recognized
the child as a separate entity with independent interests. As
Justice Zilberg wrote in Shtiner v. The Slate, "The child is not
an 'object' . . . , but rather a 'subject,' a litigant in his own right

... .It is not possible to ignore his own interests under any
circumstances, and it is not possible for us to reject them in
favor of the 'right' of someone else, be it his father or
mother." 55 Under the best interests principle, every child is
entitled to a relationship with both parents, regardless of
relations between them. 5 Furthermore, children can collect
damages from parents for harms suffered as a result of
psychological neglect and abandonment. 57 Thus, not only do
parents have rights with respect to their children, but children
have rights with respect to their parents.
Besides obligating parents to care for children's physical
and psychological needs, Israeli law also imposes specific
requirements on parental authority. First, parents must adhere
to government regulations, such as the Compulsory Education
Law.58 Second, sections 323-327 of the Penal Law impose a
duty on parents to protect the child from abuse. 9 Failure to
fulfill this duty
is a crime punishable by up to three years
60
imprisonment.
Social service agencies, moreover, have the authority to
intervene in family matters. In less severe cases, the assistance
is geared toward improving the functioning of parents, while in
more serious ones, the state intervenes to protect children from
their parents. When a court declares a minor to be "a minor in
need" under the Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, a welfare
officer may take over the care and supervision of the minor,
sC.A. 209/54, Shtiner v. State, 9 P.D. 241, 251.

5"Rosen-Zvi, supra note 54, at 92.
57C.A.

2034/98, Yitzhak Amin v. David Amin, 53(5) P.D. 69.
58 Compulsory Education Law, 5709-1949, 3 L.S.I. 125, (1948-49).
s9 Penal Law, 5737-1977, Sections 323-27, Special Volume L.S.I. 54, (1976-

77).
60

Rosen-Zvi, supra note 54, at 94.
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including revoking parental authority to make certain
decisions.
In extreme cases, the declaration also allows for
transferal of the minor to a foster family and restriction of the
parents' visitation rights. Under the Capacity and Guardianship
Law of 1962, a court has jurisdiction to completely or partially
cancel the guardianship of one or both parents and to appoint
additional guardians. 62 Under the Adoption of Children Law of
1981, a court can declare 63
children adoptable and separate them
parents.
natural
their
from
Not only state authorities can interfere in families, but
every citizen has a duty to report behavior within the family in
certain cases. Sections 368D(a)-(h) of the Penal Law of 1977
prescribes, "There is a general duty to report that is imposed
upon anyone who has reasonable grounds to believe that an
offense has been committed bZ a person who has charge of a
minor... against said minor." 65 Failure to report is punishable
by up to three months in'prison.
3. Corporal Punishment of Children

Looking at Israeli law, it is possible to see a
development in legal approach leading up to the Plonitdecision.
a. Legislation

Unlike in the United States, there is no parent-child tort
immunity in Israel. 6 Provision 23 of the Law of Torts (New
67
Version) prohibits an assault of every type against another.
However, Provision 24(7) initially provided a reasonable
6' Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 5720-1960, 2 L.S.1. 44 (1960-1961).
62 Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962, 16 L.S.I 106 (1962-63).
63 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 54, at 93.

6Penal Law, 5737-1977, § 368D(a-h), Special Volume L.S.I. 54, (1976-77).
65 id.

6Dana Cohen, Legal Standing of Corporal Punishment for Educational
Purposes by Parents and Teachers in the Age of New Basic Laws 5 (2000)
thesis) (on file with author).

(unpublished
67

1d.
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corporal punishment defense for the defendant if "the defendant
is the parent or custodian or teacher of the plaintiff ... and he
harms the plaintiff to a necessary and reasonable extent for the
improvement of the plaintiff's ways." 68 On June 13, 2000, the
Knesset passed into law Anat Maor's bill to rescind6924(7)'s
special defense for the corporal punishment of children.
Similarly, criminal law in Israel, Provision 379 of the
Penal Code of 1977, considers every physical assault against
another to be a criminal violation, even if the person suffers no
physical harm. 70 However, it also recognizes the general
defense of "justification."
This has been interpreted as
permitting acts falling within "limited social norms," including
the use of "reasonable" corporal punishment
for educational
71
minor.
a
of
custodian
the
by
purposes
Eight years ago, the Knesset considered a proposed
penal law that would explicitly protect custodian authority to hit
children for educational purposes not to exceed the bounds of
reasonableness. This proposal passed the first stage of Knesset
review. It was then vigorously fought by children's rights
organizations and soundly defeated. 2
b. Court Decisions
In 1953, in Dalai Rasi v. The State of Israel, the
Supreme Court recognized as legitimate custodial use of
corporal punishment, as long as it is reasonable. 73 It maintained
that "there is no serious disagreement in the law that parents or
educators are entitled to punish children under their care or
supervision, and even through the use of corporal punishment,
. 68 Orit Shtiver, Spare the Rod, Loving the Child,TO BE A FAMILY: THE
PERIODICAL ACCOMPANYING THE FAMILY 2000, at 7 1.
69 Roth, supra note 50.

70 Penal Law, 5737-1977, § 379, Special Volume L.S.I. 54, (1976-77).
71Shtiver, supra note 68.
712
Galit Levi-Samorai, Spare the Rod, 46 PARENTS AND CHILDREN, March
2000, at 12; Yafa HaOzer, Without Hands, 79 PARENTS AND CHILDREN,

1994, at 20.
73 Cr.A. 7/53, Rasi v. State of Israel, 7(2) P.D. 790, 793.
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74
and it is just a question of the severity of the punishment."
Thus, parents and educators could use "moderate and
acceptable" punishment in order "to uproot the bad from the
soul of the child.",75 In this case, however, the Court held that
use of force in pushing a child's head against a wall, in pricking
a child's lip76with a needle, and in kicking a child's back was not
reasonable.
On January 12, 1992, Judge Strashnov of the Tel Aviv
District Court similarly defended parental authority to use
corporal punishment on children. He held that "[c]orporal
punishment by a parent towards his child with the goal of
educating him, disciplining him and curbing his behavior, as
long as it is accomplished to a reasonable extent, with careful
consideration and humane wisdom - it is not disqualified from
an educational respect and it is not legally prohibited., 77 A7
father was accused of kicking his son in the stomach, causing
his daughter a bloody nose, heavily whipping his son with a
belt, and pulling the son's hair until he fell to the ground. Judge
Strashnov dismissed all these accusations, except for the kick to
the stomach, based on the unreliability of the witnesses: the
grandmother as "unstable and hysterical," the daughter as
mentally "limited," and the son as "completely unrestrained,"
lacking "inner peace and quiet," and subject to "wild
outbursts." 78 As for the kick to the stomach, Judge Strashnov

concluded that it was not "exceptional and unreasonable ... to
the point of becoming a criminal offense." 79 He was able to

consider it "reasonable" because the father did not aim to hit the
boy's stomach, but his backside, and the stomach received the
blow only as a result of the boy's movement to escape from the
kick.80 As Orit Shtiver points out, this reasoning, of course,
74 id.
75 Id.
76 id.

7 Cr.C. (T.A.) 570/91, State of Israel v. Ploni, 52(I) P.M. 431, at 436-37.

78 Id.
79

Id. at 436.
go 1d.
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does not take into consideration that it is foreseeable for a child
to "try and escape from a physical attack." 81 Judge Strashnov
supported his decision by referring to the parental obligation to
educate children and teach them "moral principles and values"
and to Torat Moshe and the Hebrew proverb, "He who spares
the rod hates his child."82
Judge Strashnov's decision, however, caused a storm of83
protest amongst educators, psychologists, and social workers.
Children's rights organizations urgently turned to the Minister
of Justice, requesting an appeal of the decision. 84 Judge
Strashnov ended up writing a book, Children and Youth in the
Mirror of Law, to justify his opinion.85 In this book, he points
to the widespread violence among the young and the rise in
crimes committed by juveniles in 1995,8 6 arguing that "the
education of the child necessitates the setting of frameworks
and clear rules ...the child must not be allowed to do as he
wishes and to live his life without an educational and limiting
framework. 87 He finds absurd the consideration of "all
moderate physical punishment for educational purposes" as a
criminal offense, and writes of the need to clearly differentiate
between appropriately used corporal punishment and systematic
hitting or abuse. 88 Although Judge Strashnov does not renounce
the use of corporal punishment for educational purposes, he
differentiates between a hit or two and "systematic" hitting or
the use corporal punishment as an educational method.

8'Shtiver, supra note 68, at 72.
82 Cr.C. (T.A.) 570/9 1, State of Israel v. Ploni, 52(I) P.M. 43 1, at 435.
8' Levi Eden, Corporal Punishment or Physical Abuse?, THE ACADEMIC:
JOURNAL OF THE ACADEMIA ON THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES,

Feb. 1994, at 7.
84 Yosi Miller, Corporal Punishment in Israel, 3 ISRAELI
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, 1993, at 69.

JOURNAL FOR

85 AMNON STRASHNOV, CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN THE MIRROR OF LAW

(2000).
86 Id. at 9-I1.
87 Id. at 187.
88

Id. at 87-188.

156

OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

After 1993, there was a shift in courts' positions on the
issue of corporal punishment, and a number of decisions clearly
rejected corporal punishment as an educational means. Judge
Astrovski Cohen, for instance, determined that corporal
punishment is a criminal violation.8 9 Another turning point was
the 1996 ruling in which Judge Pilpel of the Beersheva District
Court uncompromisingly determined that "violence towards90
children cannot be used as an educational means in any case."
Citing the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, he
explained, "A minor is considered 'human,' accordingly his
beating negates his basic human rights, and the parent has no
right to do this." 9' Thus, although Plonit marked the first time
the Supreme Court decisively rejected the corporal punishment
of children, previous lower court opinions had already come to
this conclusion.
The Plonit decision was also preceded by Sde-Or in
1998, where the Supreme Court held that "the use of violence
by an educator towards his students conflicts with Israeli
society's views on education, its goals, and its realization, and
thus cannot be viewed as reasonable." 92 In this case, a
kindergarten teacher, who would hit, pull, push, and throw the
children under her care was brought to trial. The teacher
justified her use of force "as an educational means that was
supposed to bring children back to order, and principally the
'young children that do not yet understand that there is
discipline, a framework and rules in kindergarten, and this is a
way to clarify to them that there are such laws."' 93 The Court,
however, rejected this logic, fearing that "violence is liable to
serve as a model for the students to copy and also to harm their
89 Yafa HaOzer,

Without Hands, 79 PARENTS AND CHILDREN, 1994, at 20.

90 Tova Tzimuki, No Hands, YEDI'OT AHARONOT, Oct. 30, 1996, at I.
91ACRI (Association for Civil Rights in Israel), COMMENTS ON THE
COMBINED INITIAL AND FIRST PERIODIC REPORTS CONCERNING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT OF CIVIL AND

POLITICAL RIGHTS [hereinafter ICCPR], Submitted to the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (July 1998) (quoting Cr.A. (B.S.) 1059/96).
92 Cr.A. 5224/97, State of Israel v. Sde-Or, 54(3) P.D. 572, 579.
9'id at 575.
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development." 94 Not only did the Court perceive the corporal
punishment of children as endangering their own "well-being,"
but also as socially harmful and "liable to harm the basic values
of our society - human dignity and physical integrity."9' Thus,
corporal punishment for educational purposes is a logical
In strong
impossibility and can never be "reasonable."
language, the Court explained, "Physical violence towards the
student is prohibited. Flogging, hitting, and pulling ears have
no place in school. The classroom is a place of instruction and
not an arena of violence. The 96body and soul of the student are
not to be treated as worthless."

In support of its decision, the Court cited the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, provision 19(1); lower court
decisions; and Jewish law. It pointed to the fact that "the cases
decided in the past few years have held that the penal code
prohibits the use of corporal punishment as an educational
means." 97 Anchoring its approach in Jewish authority, it also
quoted Rabbi Yitzchak Levi, the Minister of Culture and
Education, who stated, "It is clear beyond any doubt that
Judaism does not recommend the use of hitting as an
educational method, and I would even go further and say that in
the era we now live, it completely prohibits 'education' through
hitting - seeing it as a contradiction in terms." 98 Thus, the
Court concluded, "The view expressing permission to use
violent means for educational 99purposes no longer reflects the
social norms acceptable to us."

c. Post-Plonit Developments
Soon after the Plonit decision came out, perhaps in a
show of solidarity with the Court, the Knesset passed the Pupils
a 578.
9'Id. at 579.
94Id

9

id.

97 Id. at 578.
8

Id.

9 Id.
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Rights Law, which explicitly established, "Every student is
entitled to a disciplinary system in educational institutions
conducted in a way respecting human dignity and is specifically
entitled not to have corporal
or humiliating disciplinary means
00
used against him."'
Then, in May 2002, the Supreme Court approved the
removal of a teacher who systematically used violence against
his students, after he injured a student by hitting her face with a
plastic cone so that she required medical attention. The Court
declared, "There can be no acceptance for an educational
approach based on the taking of violent measures against
minors."''
The Court further rejected as irrelevant the claim
that corporal punishment was acceptable in the homes of the
school's Arab students. It explained, "The laws of the State
apply to all segments of the population even if past traditions
make it difficult to uproot this once accepted phenomenon.
Today, we cannot endorse
norms that violate a child physically
02
or psychologically."'
B. International Treatment of
Punishment of Children

the

Corporal

1. International Law
Under international law, two main documents protect
children: The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the
Child and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child.0 3 Although these two documents do not specifically
address corporal punishment, they establish children's right to
physical integrity, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child
has interpreted the Convention to prohibit corporal punishment.
10o

Pupils Rights Law, 2000, S.H. 42, Provision 10.

10' D.A. 1682/02, Wahab v. State of Israel (not yet published).
102 D.A. 1682/02, Wahab v. State of Israel (not yet published).
103Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N.

GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16,

at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); CRC, supra note 19.
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The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the
Child, approved by the United Nations General Assembly in
1959, is the first expression of international human rights law
concerning children. This Declaration does not impose binding
obligations on states and aims for the progressive realization of
children's rights. The Declaration sets out a positive right to
protection for children. Thus, in the Preamble, it explains that
"the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity,
needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal
protection," linking needs and rights.'°4 Principle 2 goes on to
assert, "The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be
given opportunities and facilities, by law and by other means, to
enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually
and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions
of freedom and dignity."' 10 5 Principle 9 refers specifically to
abuse, stating that "[t]he child shall be protected against all
forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation."10 6
In the
Declaration, children's rights are rooted in the inherent "dignity
and worth of the human person.. 107 By virtue of their
humanity, children are entitled to the protections necessary for
them to live with dignity.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, approved unanimously by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1989, presents the first comprehensive
international articulation of children's rights. 0 8 It went into
force in 1990 and was ratified by more nations in a shorter
period1 of
since. 9 time than any other international convention before or
'o' Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 103, at Preamble.
'o' Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 103, at Principle 2.
'06 Id. at Principle 9.
'07Id. at Preamble.
l08 Gerald Abraham, Giannella Lecture: The Cry of the Children, 41 VILL.
L. REV. 1345, 1361 (1996).
109
Id. By its tenth anniversary, the Convention was adopted by 191 states -every nation except two: Somalia and the United States. Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization ofChildren's Rights: Incorporating
Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
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Unlike the 1959 Declaration, the 1989 Convention
imposes binding obligations on all the nations that have ratified
it.' 10 The Convention created the Committee on the Rights of
the Child to monitor the compliance of the treaty's parties, but
the Committee has no enforcement power.
Since the
Convention has no direct method of formal enforcement and no
court to assess claims, it thus places great weight on reporting.
"Two years after ratification, each government is expected to
send the United Nations Committee a report detailing progress
made in fulfilling obligations under the Convention." I
The Convention includes a multitude of provisions
affirming children's positive right to protection. Article 19
instructs:
States Parties shall take all appropriate
legislative, administrative,
social
and
educational measures to protect the child
from all forms of physical or mental
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or
negligent
treatment,
maltreatment
or
exploitation, including sexual abuse, while
in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or
any other person who has the care of the
child." 3
Thus, in cases of abuse, the child explicitly "has the right to the
4
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.""1
1, 41 (Dec. 1999). Timor-Leste, which became independent in 2002, also

has not ratified the Convention; Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod. Embrace
our Humanity

Towarda New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal

Punishment of Children, 31 U. MicI-i. J.L. REFORM. 353, 390 (1998).
110Abraham, supra note 108, at 1363.

"'Id. at 1366.
112 JANE

FORTIN, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING LAW 44-45

(London, 1998).
113 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess. 6 1st ntg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (1989).

14Id. at art. 16.
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Article 20 further specifies cases where a child "shall be entitled
5
to special protection and assistance provided by the State."" I
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has paid
particular attention to a child's right to physical integrity and
protection from corporal punishment in monitoring
implementation of the Convention.' 16 The Committee has
repeatedly stressed that the corporal punishment of Children is
incompatible with the Convention and it is necessary to ban it in
families in order for reporting countries to achieve treaty
compliance."17 Guidelines for country reports require that they
indicate "whether legislation (criminal and/or family law)
includes a prohibition of all forms of physical and mental
violence, including corporal punishment, deliberate humiliation,
injury, abuse, neglect or exploitation, inter alia within the
family." 118 As the basis for this policy, the Committee has
interpreted Article 19 as an absolute prohibition of corporal
punishment of children. The Committee further points to
Article 24, paragraph 3 and Article 37 to support its
interpretation. Article 24, paragraph 3 states, "States Parties
shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to
abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of
children," and the Committee perceives the use of physical force
to educate children as such a practice.1 19 The Committee
further perceives corporal punishment to fall within Article 37's
prohibition of "torture or 20other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."'1

Marta Santos Pais, the Committee's rapporteur, links the
prohibition on the corporal punishment of children to their
fundamental human dignity. In1996, she explained that "[t]he
right not to be subject to any form of physical punishment ...
flows as a consequence of the consideration [in the Convention
"J

Id. at art. 20.

11

Id.

116Bitensky,

supra note 109, at 392.

..Id. at 395.
"9 CRC, supra note 19, at art. 24, 3.
20 Id at art. 37.
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of the Child] of the child as a person whose human dignity
should be respected."' 12' The High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Mary Robinson, echoed this notion. She stated,
The recourse to physical punishment by adults reflects a
denial of the recognition, by the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, of the child as a subject of human
rights. If we want to remain faithful to the spirit of the
Convention, based strongly on the dignity of the child as
a full-fledged bearer of rights, then122any act of violence
against him or her must be banned.
2. Common Law Countries
a. United Kingdom
English law contains statutory acknowledgement of the
right of any parent to administer corporal punishment to a
child. 123 The Children and Young Person's Act, § 1, Part 1124
prohibits assaults against minors, but provision 7 is quick to
reassure that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as
affecting the right of any parent ... or any other person having

lawful control or charge of a child or young person to
administer punishment to him."' 25 Paragraph 24(7) of the Civil
Wrongs Ordinance establishes that in a suit for the tort of
assault, the defendant will have a defense if he or she "is the
121Bitensky, supra note 109, at 398 (quoting Marta Santos Pais, Address at
the International Seminar on Worldwide Strategies and Progress Towards
Ending All Physical Punishment of Children (Dublin, Ireland, Aug. 22,
1996).
122Peter Newell, Key United Nations Human Rights Body Urges UK to Ban
All Physical Punishment, CHILDREN ARE UNBEATABLE!, at

http://www.nospank.net/n-j07.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2003).

123CHRIS BARTON & GILLIAN DOUGLAS, LAW AND PARENTHOOD 150-151

(1995).

124Amended in the framework of the Children Act, 1989, c. 41, sched. 12-13

(Eng.).
325 Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, c 12, § I (Eng.).
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parent or guardian or teacher of the plaintiff, or his or her status
in regard to the plaintiff is similar to that of a parent or guardian
or teacher, and he or she punished the plaintiff in an amount
reasonably ' 26
necessary in order that the plaintiff correct his or her
behavior."'
Case law also establishes the parental right to administer
corporal punishment. According to R. v. Hopley, a parent may
inflict moderate and reasonable corporal punishment for the
purpose of correcting a child or punishing an offense.' 27 In this
case, it was held reasonable for a father to grant a teacher
permission to chastise his son severely and "that if necessary he
should do it again and again" and "continue it at intervals even
if he held out for hours." The thirteen year-old boy eventually
died from this flogging. 12 R. v. Woods explained that whether
or not a punishment is reasonable must depend on all the facts
of a case and, in particular, the age and strength of a child and
nature and degree of a punishment. 29 Reasonable punishments
have been found to include beatings with sticks, belts, and
slippers. 130 Since Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area
Health Authority, it seems unlikely that corporal punishment
13 1
can be justified at all in the case of a child over sixteen.
There has been international pressure on the United
Kingdom to change its policies. In 1995, after examining the
United Kingdom's first report under the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child recommended that corporal punishmeht be prohibited and
criticized the defense of "reasonable chastisement." In May
126A

similar defense to the tort of imprisonment is found in Paragraph 27(6)

of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance. Neither of these provisions exempt a parent
from liability imposed by the criminal law.
12 R. v. Hopley(1860) 175 Eng. Rep. 1204.
128 BARTON & DOUGLAS, supra note 123, at 15 1.
129(1921) 85 JP 272; P. M. BROMLEY & N.V. LOWE, BROMLEY's FAMILY
LAW 274 (7th ed. 1987).

130PETER NEWELL, Respecting

Children's Right to Physical Integrity, in THE

HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE

219 (Bob Franklin ed., 1995).
"' (1986) AC 112; BARTON & DOUGLAS, supra note 123, at 152.
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2002, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
rights echoed this recommendation. 132
In A. v. United
Kingdom, decided in 1998, the European Court of Human
Rights found that English law did not adequately protect a child
repeatedly flogged with a garden cane by his stepfather, who
was subsequently acquitted under the defense of "reasonable
chastisement." The Court held that English law violated Article
3 of the European Convention for Human Rights, requiring
"States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals
within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture . . . or
degrading treatment or punishment," and thus legal reform was
necessary. 133 In their 1985 Paper, Recommendation No. 85(4),
para. 12, the Committee Ministers of the Council of Europe
expressed their hope that member states would "review their
legislation on the power to punish children
in order to limit or
34
indeed prohibit corporal punishment."'
In addition to this pressure from international law, there
have also been movements towards reform within England
itself. During the passage of the Children's Bill through the
House of Lords, there was an unsuccessful attempt to render
physical punishment by parents unlawful.' 3 In 1986, Section
47 of the Education Act abolished corporal punishment in all
schools supported by public funding.' 3 The United Kingdom
thus became the last country in Europe
to end corporal
3
punishment in state-supported education.'
b. Canada
Under the current Canadian Criminal Code, the offense
of assault is drafted in a wide and inclusive manner. However,
since 1892, Section 43 of the Code has provided a defense for
132
Newell, supra note 122.
133
A. v. United Kingdom, [1999] 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611.
134
BARTON & DOUGLAS, supra note 123, at 15 1.
135 id. at 152.
16 CHRISTINA LYON & PETER DE CRUZ, CHILD ABUSE 242 (2nd ed. 1993).
137 NEWELL, supra note 130, at 217.
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parents and other persons in positions of authority where the
assault occurs in the context of correcting a child, as long as
"reasonable" force is used. It states as follows: "Every
schoolteacher, parent or person standing in the place of a parent
is justified in using force by way of correction toward a pupil or
child, as the case may be, who is under his care, if the force
1' 38
does not exceed what is reasonable under the circumstances."
Interestingly, while conferring a right to correct with reasonable
force, Section 43 does not define the circumstances under which
correction can ensue, in marked contrast with other
justifications in the Code.
The Canadian Supreme Court has sought to limit the
availability of the Section 43 defense by strictly construing who
may invoke it and the circumstances surrounding when it may
be invoked. In its leading ruling on Section 43, the Court
explained that the section should be read restrictively, precisely
because it "exculpates the use of what would otherwise be
criminal force by one group of persons against another. It
protects the first group of persons, but, it should be noted, at the
same time it removes the protection of the criminal law from the
second."' 139 In defining reasonable force, the Canadian Supreme
Court stated:
The court will consider, both from an objective
and subjective standpoint, such matters as the
nature of the offense calling for correction, the
age and character of the child and the likely
effect of the punishment of this particular child,
the degree of gravity of the punishment, the
circumstances under which it was inflicted, and
the injuries, if any, suffered. If the child suffers
injuries which may endanger life, limbs. . . or is
disfigured that alone would be sufficient to find

'3
139

Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 43 (1985) (Can.).
Ogg-Moss v. The Queen,[ 198412 S.C.R. 173.
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that

the

punishment

administered
1 40

was

unreasonable under the circumstances.

The Supreme Court has refused to accept justifications for
excessive force based on localized standards, requiring instead a
"Canadian community" standard.' 4 1 Courts have also been
hesitant to apply Section 43 as children approach the age of
maturity. For instance, in R. v. J.O.W., the judge stated, "In
light of the age of I.L., she was almost an adult, 42 such
punishment in my opinion would be counter-productive."'
Canadian judges have further heavily criticized Section
43 for its lack of clarity and for conflicting with the Convention
on the Rights of the Child. In R. v. J.O.W., the judge expressed
his:
[h]ope that the law makers will see to
establish clearer rules, so that parents will
know with some degree of certainty when
they are permitted to physically discipline
their children; or alternatively, if Parliament
determines that corporal punishment is no
longer tolerable in our society, to then repeal
Section 43 of the Code. The current state of
uncertainty is inadequate to protect children,
while simultaneously, potentially placing
at risk of
otherwise law abiding parents
143
obtaining a criminal record.
Then, in R. v. James, the Court exclaimed the following:
[T]he Convention stands in direct conflict with
the state of the law. One wonders how section
43 can remain in the Criminal Code in the face
140

R. v. Dupperon, [19841 16 C.C.C. (3d) 453, 460.

"'1
R. v. O.J. [1996] O.J. 647.

R. v. J.O.W. [19961 O.J. 4601, at para. 35.
"4Id.at para. 4-5.
142
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of Canada's international commitment. To the
extent this paradox might inform any discussion
of the constitutionality of the defence, it is not a
question likely to be tested by a court, because
the party who would have to raise the question
would be the crown itself.

.

. The only personal

view I will express is that I think
this is an area
144
that begs for legislative reform.
c. United States
Historically, in the United States, children could not
bring tort suits against their parents and others standing in loco
parenlis, 145 including suits for harm caused by corporal
punishment. 146 However, the modem trend has been for courts
to restrict the application of parental immunity and to permit
civil lawsuits by children against parents.48147 As of 1988,
seventeen states still retained this immunity.
The Model Penal Code typifies the American attitude,
explicitly protecting parents' right to use physical force on
children as long as two conditions are met: the force is used for
the purpose of "promoting the welfare of the minor" and the
force is not excessive. 149 While approximately half of the states
have statues establishing a parental defense for the corporal
punishment of children, the remaining states rely on case-law

144 R. v. James [1998] O.J. 1438, at para. 9.
145 Refers to parent figures.
146Judge

Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System,

36 SANA CLARA L. REV. 983, 1007-1008 (1996).

141 Sandra L. Haley, The Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine: Is it a Defensible

Defense?, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 575, 603 (1996) ("The doctrine of parental
tort immunity was created by 1891 case law and has been substantially
abrogated in most of the states which had adopted it."); See, eg., Gillet v.
Gillett, 335 P.2d 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).

Karen A. Bussel, Note, Adventures in Babysitting: Gestational Surrogate
Mother Tort Liability, 41 DUKE L.J. 661, 676 n.91 (1991).
148

149

MODEL PENAL CODE, § 3.08 (2001).
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precedent to define the scope of the privilege. 5° The majority
rule is that a parent is not criminally liable for an assault on a
child. if the blow to the child's body constitutes "reasonable
15
force" and is administered for a disciplinary purpose.
The policies of the state of Minnesota stand in
interesting contrast to the rest of the United States. Reading
Minnesota's various relevant statutory provisions together, it
becomes apparent that what would be "reasonable" corporal
punishment of children in any other state is an assault under
Minnesota law.' 5 2 Since corporally punishing children is "an
attempt to inflict pain, or place a child in fear of pain in an
effort to reform behavior" even mild forms, such as spanking,
53
would constitute a fifth degree assault under Minnesota law.1
Minnesota has lived under this prohibition on the corporal
punishment for many years. However, Minnesota has exercised
prosecutorial restraint in enforcement, and there are no reported
cases of parents prosecuted for administering mild punishment
to children. 5 4 Furthermore, although no corporal punishment is
legal, mandated reports are only necessary when a physical
assault actually produces injury.' 55
The main result of
Minnesota eliminating the right of parents to hit children has
been the avoidance of the often endless litigation endured in
other states, 156 over what constitutes a reasonable blow to a
child.' 57
S0

Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment. The Parental Corporal

Punishment Defense- Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998
U. ILL. L. REV. 413,436.
' s Victor I. Vieth, When Parental Discipline is a Crime. Overcoming the

Defense of Reasonable Force, 32 AUG PROSECUTOR 29 (1998).
"2 Bitensky, supra note 109, at 386-387. It is necessary to read Minn. Stat.
§ 609.379, which appears to permit "reasonable" corporal punishment of
children in conjunction with §§ 609.224 and 609.02.
153 Victor I. Vieth, Passover in Minnesota.: MandatedReporting and the
Unequal Protection ofAbused Children, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 13 1,
143 (1998).
154 Bitensky, supra note 109, at 388.
155 Vieth, supra note 153, at 144.
156 State v. Crouser, 911 P.2d 725 (Haw. 1996).
117 Vieth, supra note 153, at 143, n.78.
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Despite the wide existence of statutes protecting
corporal punishment of children, there has also been some
movement towards its restriction. Certain adults who stand in
loco parentis to a child are prohibited from utilizing any type of
corporal punishment. For instance, certain state regulations
prohibit foster parents from using corporal punishment. The
California Foster Family Home Regulations declare that "[e]ach
child shall have personal rights which include, but are not
limited to, the following: . . . To be free from corporal
punishment or unusual punishment, infliction of pain,
humiliation, intimidation, ridicule, coercion, threat, mental
abuse, or other actions of a punitive nature ... .,,58 Other states
have adopted similar restrictions for foster parents. 159 In
California, the prohibition against corporal punishment has been
extended by statute to private day nurseries, even if parents
agree that caretakers may use such punishment when their child
is disobedient. The statute has been upheld by the court of
appeals. t60 Although the Supreme Court found the corporal
punishment of students constitutional,16 1 over half of the states
now prohibit its use by teachers. In 1974, only two states
banned corporal punishment in schools. By 1994, twenty-seven
states had outright prohibitions and an additional eleven states,
by local rules, banned the corporal punishment of children in
public schools.' 62 The American Bar Association rejects the
use of corporal punishment, declaring, "BE IT RESOLVED,
that the American Bar Association opposes the use of corporal
punishment in institutions where children are cared for or
educated and urges that state laws which
permit such corporal
' 63
punishment be amended accordingly."'
'58Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 22, § 87072 (repealed).

159
Edwards, supra note 146, at 1017-1020.
160 Id. at 1017.
161Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
162 Edwards, supra note 146, at 1014, n.230.
161Id. at n. 23 I. "The professional organizations that formally oppose [the]
corporal punishment of children include the American Academy of
Pediatrics, the American Medical Association, the American Bar
Association, the American Public Health Association, the American
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3. Countries Rejecting Corporal Punishment
a. Statutory Protection of Children
1) Scandinavian Countries
a) Sweden

In 1979, the International Year of the Child, Sweden
became the first country to enact a statute, banning the corporal
punishment of children. 164 As amended in 1983, the statute
states, "Children are entitled to care, security and a good
upbringing. They shall be treated with respect for their person
and their distinctive character and may not be subject to
corporal punishment or any other humiliating treatment."' 65
The use of the phrase "respect for their person" evokes the
concept of dignity.
Prior to the 1979 legislation, Sweden had a long
tradition of corporal punishment in the family context. 66
Sweden's Penal Code allowed parents to avoid criminal liability
for corporally punishing their children, and in 1920, when
Swedish family law was codified, parents were expressly
granted the right to punish their children by using physical
force. 167 Both religious and legal codes reiterated the proverb

Psychological Association, the National Parent-Teacher Association, the
National Association of School Psychologists, the National Education
Association, the National Association of Social Workers, and the National

Association of Pediatric Nurse Associates and Practitioners ... and the
American Humane Society." Id. at 1020-1022, n.263.
'6 Geraldine Van Buren, The Family and the Rights oftthe Child in

International Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD 88 (1995).
165

Bitensky, supra note 109, at 362 (quoting Swedish Children and Parents

Code, ch. 6, § I para. 2 (Swedish Ministry of Justice trans.)).
166

id.

16' Edwards, supra note 146, at 10 18.
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that sparing the rod spoils the child. 168 As long as injuries were
not permanent, parents could engage in "regular - often weekly
- harsh beatings to drive out the devil and make [children] firm
for God's will." 169
However, as corporal punishment was increasingly
accompanied by widespread child abuse, the Swedish
legislature decided to intervene. It established a Commission
on Children's Rights, which prepared a report revealing that
"[cihild psychiatrists and psychologists have long been in
agreement that physical punishment of children is
inappropriate."' 170
Between 1965 and 1979, the Swedish
government progressively restricted parents' right to use
corporal punishment to discipline children. Efforts culminated
in 1979 with the ban on all corporal punishment. 71' The
legislature adopted this measure by a nearly unanimous vote,
emphasizing the role of law in changing the attitudes of parents.
172

Sweden has exercised a policy of prosecutorial restraint
in enforcing this ban on corporal punishment, preferring instead
to pour its energies into educating the public. The law itself
appears in the civil, not criminal code, and it does not provide
specific sanctions for violators. 73 The government's stated
intent in passing the law was two-fold: primarily "to stop
beatings," but also "to create a basis for general information and
education for parents as to the importance of giving children
food care and as to one of the prime requirements of their care."
The government thus supplemented the law with a
massive education campaign and by providing extensive
16S Dennis

A. Olson, The Swedish Ban of Corporal Punishment, 1984 BYU

L. REV. 447,447.
169 Edwards, supra note 146, at 1018 (quoting Peggy O'Mara, MOTHERING
42 (1994)).
170Olson, supra note 168, at 457.
171Johnson, supra note 150, at 477.
172Olson, supra note 168, at 453.

113 Edwards, supra note 146, at 1019.

114 Id. at 1018 (citing Peggy O'Mara, MOTHERING 42 (1994)).
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support services to families. 75 The public school system served
as an important vehicle to reach children. Children were taught
what parents could and could not do and how they should
respond when punished corporally.
Parental education
programs instructed parents on alternate discipline methods that
did not make use of physical punishment.' 76 The government
also distributed mailings to every family with a young child and
to daycare facilities. The Ministry of Justice circulated 600,000
copies of a pamphlet entitled, "Can you bring up children
successfully without smacking and spanking?"' 17 7
This
pamphlet explains:
Should physical chastisement meted out to a
child cause bodily injury or pain which is
more than of very temporary duration, it is
classified as an assault and is an offense
punishable under the Criminal Code . . .
[Tirivial offenses will remain unpunished,
either because they cannot be classified as
assault or because an action is not
78
brought."1
Finally, the media aggressively informed the public about the
new law. 179 Milk cartons in Sweden carried a cartoon of a girl
saying, "I'll never ever hit my own children," and an
explanation of the law. 180
Since the 1960s when legal reforms against physical
punishment in Sweden began, there has been evidence of
dramatic changes in the attitudes of Swedish parents. Although
15 Bitensky, supra note 116, at 362.
176Johnson,

supra note 150, at 477-78 (quoting Dennis Olson); Edwards,

supra note 146, at 1019.
NEWELL, supra note 130, at 219.
,78 Id at 219 (quoting Ministry of Justice, Can you bring up children
successfully without smacking andspanking? (1979)).
179 Edwards, supra note 146, at 1019.
,SONEWELL, supra note 130, at 219 (quoting Ministry of Justice, Canyou
bring up children successfully without smacking and spanking? (1979)).
'7
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a majority of Swedes opposed the law when it was passed
fifteen years ago, it is now overwhelmingly supported.' 8'
Public opinion polls carried out between 1965 and 1981 showed
a doubling of the proportion of parents who believed that
children should be raised without corporal punishment (from
35% to 71%, 74% of women and 68% of men).18 2 Over the
same period, the proportion of people who believed corporal

punishment was "sometimes necessary" halved from 53% to
26% and "don't knows" came down from 12% to 3%. 13 A
1995 report indicated that only 11% of the Swedish population
supports the use of corporal punishment. As societal tolerance
for corporal punishment steadily declined, so has the rate of
fatal child abuse. 184 After examining the effects of the Swedish
law, Professor Adrienne Haeuser concluded, "The law has
dramatically reduced physical punishment and commitment to
it. It has broken the inter-generational transmission of the
practice. It has helped to reduce serious child-battering . . .
have welcomed having a 'clear line'
Professionals in particular
85
parents."'
to
to transmit
b) Finland
In Finland, a prohibition on the corporal punishment of
children in the family was enacted in 1983 as part of a general
overhaul of Finnish law governing children.'1 6 The ban was
adopted unanimously, without debate, and went into effect on
January 1, 1984.187 The Prohibition states, "A child shall be
brought up with understanding, security and gentleness. He
shall not be subdued, corporally punished or otherwise
humiliated. The growth of a child towards independence,
181 Edwards,

supra note 146, at 1018.

182 NEWELL,

supranote 130, at 220 (citing SIFO- Swedish polling agency

(1981)).
183 id.
184Johnson,

supra note 150, at 478.
185 NEWELL, supra note 130, at 220.
186Bitensky,
187 Id.

supra note 109, at 368.
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responsibility and adulthood shall be supported and
encouraged."'188 Here the word "humiliated" seems to refer to
the concept of dignity. Parents who violate the prohibition may
be prosecuted for assault or sued for damages. 89 The Finnish
government also conducted a nationwide campaign to educate
adults about alternative ways to teach their children. 10
In Finland, as in Sweden, opinion polls have shown a
significant drop in support for corporal punishment. In 1989,
Central Union for Child Welfare carried out a major survey of
the experiences and views of fifteen and sixteen year-old
teenagers, who were already ten years old when the law came
into effect. The survey found that 19% of the teenagers had
experienced mild violence from parents, and 5% severe
violence. When asked whether they believed they would use
physical punishment
in the upbringing of their own children,
19
only 5% said yes.
c) Denmark
In 1985, Denmark became the third Scandinavian
country to enact a law directed against the corporal punishment
of children in the family context. 92 As amended in May 1997,
the law asserts, "The child has the right to care and security. It
shall be treated with respect for its personality and may not be
subjected to corporal punishment or any other offensive
treatment."' 193 The statute explicitly endows children with
positive rights to care and security and emphasizes "respect."
Unlike its Swedish and Finnish counterparts, the original
Danish statute was understood to be entirely precatory, and it
did not abolish parents' right to inflict corporal punishment as a
188

Id.

"' Id. at 370.
19Did.

191NEWELL, supra note 130, at 221 (citing Sariola 28-9 (1992)).
192Bitensky, supra note 109, at 371.
'93 Id. (quoting Danish Act to Amend the Act on Parental Custody and
Conviviality no. 416 I).
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child rearing technique. 194 The law was then amended in 1997
to prohibit all corporal punishment of children, making
perpetrators subject to prosecution under the Danish Criminal
Code. 195 However, it was generally understood that there would
"be no intensified or excessive action taken by law enforcement
social welfare authorities to monitor ordinary families['] private
Again, the prohibition was supposed to have
lives."' 196
primarily an educational impact, gradually persuading parents
97
to relinquish corporal punishment as a disciplinary technique.'
d) Norway
In 1987, Norway passed a statute providing that "[t]he
child shall not be exposed to physical violence or to treatment
which can threaten his physical or mental health."' 198 Similar to
the other Scandinavian statues, this prohibition is primarily
norms.
pedagogical, achieving its aims by shaping Norwegian 199
Its language does not prescribe any penalties or liability.
2) Austria

In 1989, the Austrian Parliament by unanimous vote
enacted a law which provides that "[tihe minor child must
In their orders and in the
follow the parents' orders.
implementation thereof, the parents must consider the age,
development and personality of the child; the use of force and
of infliction of physical or psychological harm are not
permitted., 200 This law bars the corporal punishment of
children by parents, but it also imposes on children the duty to
Id. at 371-72.
'9'
Id. at 372.
196Id.at 372-73 (quoting Letter from Vestergaard, Assoc. Professor, Inst. Of
Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Copenhagen (July 3, 1997)).
'94

"9Id. at 373.
'9'Id. (quoting Norwegian Parent and Child Act, art. 30, 3, as amended by

the Amending Act no. II, Feb. 6 1987 (Finn Erik Engzelius trans.).
'99 Id.at 374.
200 Id. at 375.
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obey their parents. However, the duties of parents and children
are two separate duties and not contingent on each other. The
1989 law represents a logical progression, rather than a sudden
departure from statutory precedents. In 1977, Austria had
repealed an explicit 20 authorization for parents to corporally
punish their children. 1
Like many Scandinavian countries, Austria enacted the
prohibition mainly for its educational effect, and there are not
many reported cases. 202 In addition to passing the law, the
government instituted a social service program with 2an
03
emphasis on the prevention of violence against children.
Even without prosecutorial intervention, the 1989 ban seems to
have had an effect on social norms in Austria. A study
commissioned by the Austrian Federal Ministry of the
Environment, Youth and Family indicates that as of the early
1990s, "67.5% of mothers and 68.8% of fathers categorically
reject serious
corporal punishment (beatings) as a means of
20 4
education."
3) Cyprus
In June 1994, Cyprus became the sixth nation to have
20 5
outlawed the corporal punishment of children in the home.
"The Cypriots passed a law that not only prohibits parental use
of any force against children but also makes it an offense for
violent behavior to take place in the presence of minor[s]. ' 2 °6
Parents who engage in violence can be prosecuted by
government, fined, and incarcerated. °7
Id. at 376.
202 Id. at 377.
20

'0' Id. at 378.
204 Division for Children's Rights, Austrian Fed. Ministry for Youth and
Family Affairs, Initial Report of Austria in Accordance with Article 44 of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 66, 67 (1996),
quoied in Bitensky, supra note 109, at 378.
20' Bitensky, supra note 109, at 379.
206 id.
207 id.
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b. Court Decisions Protecting Children
1) Italy
On May 16, 1996, Italy's highest court decided the
Cambria case and declared that "the use of violence for
educational purposes can no longer be considered lawful," thus
prohibiting the parental use of corporal punishment. 20 8 The
Cambria case was not decided only on the basis of the specific
legislation. Like the Plonil case, Cambria was decided on the
basis of human rights treaties, especially the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child. 20 9 Although enforcement of this
principle would be difficult, Judge Ippolito, who wrote the
opinion, predicted that it would "filter into society" as a new
norm. 2 0 This case is part of a process of legal and cultural
reforms in Italy since 1945.211 "[Als Italy moved away from
fascism, it also moved away from the concept of the
authoritarian father." 212 For instance, in the 1950s, Italy's
Supreme Court held that the Constitution barred husbands from
using any means of correction, physical or otherwise, against
their wives.213 Various provisions protecting the dignity of the
individual as214
an inalienable right were also included in Italy's
Constitution.
c. Other Steps Taken by Countries
Other countries also appear to be taking steps towards
the abolition of corporal punishment of children. Interestingly,
'03 Cambria, cass., sez VI, 18 marzo 1996, Foro It.
(Italy), quoted in Bitensky, supra note 109, at 380.
209 Bitensky, supra note 109, at 384.
210 Id. at 386.
211 Id. at 382.

211
ld.at 383.
213Id.
214 id.

H 1996,

407, at41 I
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where formal structures have been established to represent
children's interests at the government level, advocacy to end the
social and legal acceptance of corporal punishment has been
followed. In Switzerland, the Working Group on Child Abuse,
set up by the Federal Department of Internal Affairs,
recommended that the Constitution be revised to prohibit
corporal punishment and degrading treatment both within and
outside the family.2 15 In 1992, the Minister of Justice in
Germany announced that a prohibition of physical punishment
would soon be introduced.2 16
In Poland, a governmental
commission recommended a ban in the context of constitutional
reform. 2 17 The Scottish Law Commission presented a report on
family law to Parliament in 1992, in which they recommended
that it be a criminal offense to hit a child with an implement or
in any way that caused or could cause injury, significant pain, or
discomfort.2 18 In September 1993, more than 600 participants
from fifteen African countries assembled in Capetown for a
Second African Congress on Child Abuse. They unanimously
adopted a resolution supporting moves to eliminate all physical
2 19
punishment of children through legal reform and education.
IllI. Enforcement
A. Legal Impact
The legal impact of the Plonit decision is as yet
undetermined since the case was decided so recently.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court itself seems to indicate that the
role of this decision is not solely legal, but also socially
important. While legal "filters" will "prevent the imposition of
criminal liability for the use of mild force by a parent, 220 the
215 NEWELL,

supra note 130, at 223-24.

216 Id.
217 id.

218
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219 Id.
22
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"4yardstick must be clear and unequivocal, and the message" to
society is that" no corporal punishment is permitted."22 Thus,
even if legal enforcement will not and should not be absolute,
the Plonit case sends an important message that shapes social
norms. In the few cases decided in the wake of this decision,
reactions vary from support for the norm-setting function of the
Supreme Court and realization of the gravity of violence
towards children, to confusion and discomfort with the decision.
In the twelve decisions citing the Plonit decision, only three
punishment of
even mention Plonit's prohibition on corporal
2
children by parents as an educational tool.
The Supreme Court itself did not deal with the issue of
corporal punishment by parents again, but in a case where a
teacher hit, kicked, and sprayed glue on a student, it refers back
to the standards set in Plonit. Perceiving the prohibition on
corporal punishment in schools as fundamentally intertwined
with the prohibition of corporal punishment in families, the
Supreme Court linked its treatment of the teacher case with that
of Plonit. It stated, "This approach [taken by the Court in the
of
present case] also recently finds expression in the treatment 223
parents."
their
by
children
of
punishment
corporal
Approvingly citing the reasoning of Plonit, the Court explained:
The use of punishment that causes pain and
humiliation does not contribute to the child's
personality or education, but instead violates his
rights as a human being. It harms his body,
feelings, dignity, and proper development. It
distances us from our aspiration to be a society
free of violence. Therefore, the use by parents of
corporal punishment or means that humiliate and
method is now
debase the child as an educational
224
prohibited in our society.
221
222

Id.at 181.
Four decisions in the Supreme Court and seven decisions inlower courts.

22'D.A.
224

1730/00, Roe v. State of Israel, 54(5) P.D. 433, 435.
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This case also sheds light on the judicial approach to
sentencing. The Supreme Court wrote:
In an extreme case, when the teacher adopts
measures of severe violence or when he conducts
himself according to a type of violence, it is
possible that the answer is that the teacher can no
longer serve as an educator. In such a case,
distancing the teacher from the school is not
intended to add to the punishment already
imposed on the teacher by the court, but rather to
defend the welfare of the students and the proper
functioning of the educational system. In a
lighter case, it is possible to be satisfied with
moderate
disciplinary
measures, directed
principally to clarify to teachers in general that a
teacher that cannot refrain from employing
violence can expect severe measures to be taken
against him, even if he is a senior and devoted
teacher. In this way, it is 22
possible
to deter
5
teachers from violent behavior.
This can be analogized to cases of parental violence. Thus, only
in extreme cases will a child have to be separated from the
parent. Lighter cases are primarily concerned with deterrence
and setting a standard of appropriate behavior.
In The State of Israel v. Rachamim, where a father beat
his son with a shoe and mop, the Jerusalem Magistrate Court
accepted the role of law and judicial interpretation in changing
and advancing society. 226 Law is not just supposed to follow
social norms, but rather to help forge them. As the judge
declared, "The claim that time is needed in order to internalize
the values of a society is unacceptable to me." 2 7 This is
225 D.A. 1730/00, Jane Roe v. The State of Israel, 54(5) P.D. 433, 435.
226
227

Cr.C. (im.) 1423/99, State of Israel v. Rachamim, 17 P.M. 737, 738.
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especially the case when a "moral fault" threatens the fabric of
society. The judge explained, "The moral fault of hitting
children with a mop, or belt, or by throwing objects indicates a
social flaw. And well-known are the studies according to which
those who grow up in a home where communication is through
blows, internalize these ways, and pass them on to the next
generations." 228 Thus, law has a normative function. It is not
just concerned with reflecting the acceptable or "reasonable"
practices of a society. Rather legal standards can make use of
social values and social science research in order to critically
examine social practices.
However, The State of Israel v. Rachamim, nonetheless,
indicates a discomfort with the Plonit decision. Although lower
courts are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, the
judge presented the legal status of corporal punishment of
children by parents as an unsettled area of law. He stated that
"there is a disagreement of opinion in the case law regarding the
phenomenon of corporal punishment for children. On one hand,
according to the decision of Judge Strashnov, corporal
punishment with an educational goal, when it is committed to
an extent acceptable by human understanding and wisdom, is
not to be treated as criminal. However, according to the
Supreme Court's [Plonit] Case, there is no possibility for
permitting corporal punishment." 229 The judge thus puts the
Supreme Court's Plonit decision on the same standing as a
lower court opinion, contrary to the rules of precedent in Israel.
Although at the end he agrees that the father committed a
criminal act in this case, he shies away from whole-heartedly
endorsing the Plonit decision.
In The State of Israel v. Yerushalmi, the Court sidesteps
the issue of the legitimacy of corporal punishment. In this case,
a father accused of child abuse claimed in his defense that he
"perceived his actions as an educational method, and not as
violence." 230 The Court avoided disabusing him of his legal
228

Id.

229 id.
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Cr.C. (Hi.)430/00, State of Israel v. Yerushalmi, 32(9) P.M. 713, 715.
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error and pointing out that corporal punishment can never serve
as a legitimate educational tool. Instead, the Court addressed
only the question of whether his actions constituted child abuse.
Even on this question, the Court refused to completely align
itself with the Plonit decision. Although lower courts are bound
by the Supreme Court's majority opinion, the judge in the
Yerushalmi case referred to Justice Englard's partial dissent as
"an approach that is less broad.,, 23 1 Nevertheless, it does not
totally abandon Plonit, citing it to explain the justification for
severe treatment of Violations against minors. The Court
quotes, "The heightening social awareness of the gravity and
pervasiveness of the violations of minors and incompetents
moved the Israeli legislature to treat these offenders more
severely. This awareness led to an intensification of the fight
against the said negative
phenomenon not only in Israel, but
232
also in other countries."
A recent July 8, 2002 case decided by the Tel Aviv
Magistrate Court, espouses the principles of the Plonit decision,
while refusing to give it retroactive application. In this case, a
24 year-old man sued his parents for regularly employing severe
corporal punishment towards him from the age of three to
nineteen.
The judge found the son's version of events
unbelievable, but conceded that once in a while the parents hit
him in times of anger. Although the judge acquitted the parents
since their actions took place before Plonit was decided, he
declared, "However difficult a child's behavior, it cannot
provide a permissible justification for hitting him." 233 Echoing
Plonit, he maintained that "the child is not the parents'
property," and corporal punishment conflicts with the principles

Id. at 6.
Cr.A. 4596/98, Jane Roe v. The State of Israel, 54(I) P.D. 145, 158.
233 Assaf Bergerfreund, The Court Acquitted Parents Whose Son Accused
231
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of a democratic society. 234 He further stressed the law's role as
235
a tool for the achievement of social goals.
B. Governmental Response
The Plonit decision has not yet elicited much response
from government agencies. This is perhaps to be expected since
the Supreme Court itself deemphasized the direct enforcement
potential of the decision.
It is enlightening to look at the government reaction in
1996, following Judge Pilpel's district court ruling, rejecting the
corporal punishment of children as an educational tool. When
asked how this decision will affect legal enforcement, State
Attorney Edna Arbel explained, "We will decide every case
according to its individual facts. Only in the cases where the
hitting strays from the educational framework will we take
fitting action. 236 Thus, the concept of "educational hits" was
not abandoned. However, now that the Supreme Court of Israel
has ruled against the validity of this concept, it will be harder to
rely on it - or at least it will not so easily be taken for granted.
Rut Matot, the director of the Children in Danger branch of
Jerusalem's Welfare Services, stated, "From my point of view,
if we are talking about a light hit on the bottom, we will not
intervene. We, of course, recommend that parents not use
corporal punishment, but rather learn how to become good
parents without raising a hand. 237 This reasoning is in line
with the Plonit opinion and will probably reflect the current
government attitude towards the Supreme Court decision.
C. Children's Rights Organizations

234 Id.
235 Asaf

Burgerfreund, The Court Acquitted Parents Whose Son Accused
Them ofAbuse, HA'ARETZ, Jul. 9, 2002, at 7(a).
236

Tzimuki, supra note 90, at 2.
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People dealing with children's rights in the field are
generally in favor of the Plonit decision and praise it for its
normative value. However, despite the splash this decision has
made in the news, it has not yet fully penetrated to smaller
organizations working directly with families on parenting
techniques.
1. The National Council for the Child
238
The National Council for the Child (NCC),
established in 1979, is widely known as the principal children's
rights organization in Israel. 239 NCC was created by the
President of Israel in 1980 to mark the International Year of the
Child, and in 1986 it began working as an independent nongovernmental agency. 240 It is the sole agency representing the
entire spectrum of issues concerning the rights of all Israeli
children, ages 0-18.241 NCC fulfills a number of functions: it
seeks change in legislation, policy, and practice; gathers data
and monitors the extent and quality of services for children;
raises public awareness and seeks to promote the concepts of
children's rights and child protection; advocates on behalf of
children; and serves as a nation-wide address
for anyone
242
wishing to report violations of children's rights.
Established in 1998, NCC's Children's Rights Mobile
Unit visits children in schools and youth groups and teaches
them about their rights. It visits both Jewish and Arab schools

238 Known as HaMoaza HaLeumil LeShaloin HaYeled in Hebrew.

239 The National Council for the Child represents itself as "Israel's foremost
advocate for the rights and well-being of children in Israel," and this
recognition was confirmed in my research and talks with child care experts.
EFRAT ET AL., supra note 49.
240 National Council for the Child webpage, ai
http://www.crin.org/organisations/viewOrg.asp?ID=691 (last visited Apr. 25,

2003).
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all over Israel, and on average, it meets with 2500243children per
month. To date, it has seen over 200,000 children.
As perhaps to be expected, NCC strongly approves of
the Supreme Court's Plonit decision. Yitzhak Kadman, the
head of NCC, praised the decision for "finally" recognizing "the
right of children not to be exposed to violence of any kind, even
when those who use violence makes excuses for it, saying it is
'educational' or 'punitive."' 244 He stressed the norm-setting
function of the of the decision, explaining that "the ruling is
significant for its declarative value, for setting norms, for saying
24
that hitting or spanking one's child is wrong, period.' '
According to Yitzhak Kadman, "the role of the Court and the
legislature is to set public norms of authorized and prohibited
on central issues." 246 Tali Gal, NCC's legal director, echoed
these sentiments. She stated that in Plonit, the Supreme Court
took an important step, for the first time "clearly and
forbidden and
decisively" affirming that corporal punishment is 247
creating a norm that "can penetrate to the public."
Thus, NCC's leaders see the decision as not just directed
to law enforcers, but to the public at large. Acknowledging that
the public is still not fully aware of the decision, NCC is
working on informing them. Yitzhak Kadman explains, "The
Supreme Court set up a big and important signpost, but the way
still needs to be paved. NCC has for years led a campaign for
education without violence. ' 248 NCC thus sees educating the
public as vital to "completing the work" of the Supreme Court
decision. To this end, it produced a pamphlet, With Children 141Interview

with Tall Gal, Legal Director of the National Council for the
Child, in Israel (Feb. 5, 2002); THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE CHILD
YEARLY REPORT: THE COUNCIL'S ACTIVITIES IN 1999.
244 Dan Izenberg, Supreme Court: Corporal Punishment of Children is

Indefensible, THE JERUSALEM POST, at 4, Jan. 26, 2000.
245 Herb Keinon et al., Spank No More, THE JERUSALEM POST, at 313, Feb. 4,
2000.
246 Levi-Samorai, supra note 72.
247 Tall Gal Interview, supra note 243.
248 Levi-Samorai supra note 72.
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249
Without Hilling: Saying No to Corporal Punishment,
explaining the Supreme Court decision to lay terms and
addressing objections to a ban on corporal punishment. NCC is
also gearing up for a public education campaign, making active
use of the Children's Rights Mobile Unit. Not only does the
public need to understand the decision, but it is important for
parents to be aware of alternate methods of teaching and
disciplining children.250
However, the issue must be approached with care since
over 50% of families use corporal punishment, and the parents
of most of today's parents used corporal punishment. People
further cite Jewish law in support of corporal punishment.
Although certain groups engage in more corporal punishment,
branding them as such would only cause resentment. Tali Gal
explains that "all children have the same rights," and it is
unproductive to "point fingers." It is thus best25 to treat all
groups equally and expect high standards from all. '
In this way, NCC perceives both a role for courts and a
role for NGOs in safeguarding the rights of children. As Tall
Gal states, "Law is not the only tool, but it is a central tool in
the protection of children. A court can either reflect an existing
norm or lead with a norm that is supposed to exist and thereby
educate the public." 252 It is important to remember, however,
that educating the citizenry is not only a public function. "It
would be wonderful if there were more education and personal
examples of good behavior from the government, but
unfortunately, this is not the case.
Private non-profit
organizations need to take up this task. 253
Although the Plonit decision will not automatically
affect child rearing techniques, Tali Gal believes that it will
*probably directly influence child care and social workers.
249
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Social workers are aware of the decision and the problems with
corporal punishment.
As for legal enforcement officers,
however, the situation is more complicated. Although police
officers may be aware of the decision, they are not entirely
convinced that the corporal punishment of children is wrong,
and their enforcement will reflect this. Nonetheless, police
officers are starting to take the hitting of children "more and
more seriously."254
Tali Gal readily concedes that not every parent that hits
should be criminally punished. She echoes the Supreme Court,
placing her faith in legal filters to ensure that de minimis cases
are not prosecuted. According to Israeli law, if there is no
public interest in prosecuting a case, the case is closed. Tali Gal
explains that there is a spectrum of corporal punishment,
ranging from child abuse to de minims cases. The legal effect
of the Plonit decision will be felt in cases where corporal
punishment is systematically and regularly 25
used
to educate
5
children, but does not rise to the level of abuse.
As for the type of enforcement, Tali Gal maintains that
in most cases it is better not to take the parents out of the child's
home. Oftentimes, it may be best for criminal law not to
interfere, but for a case to be handled by Child Protection
Services (Pkidat Tza-ad) 6
The issue of corporal punishment will probably also
come up in custody battles between parents. Tali Gal fears that
parents, employing their children as 257
a tool to get back at each
it.
misuse
will
divorce,
a
during
other
2. Defense for Children International
Defense for Children International (DCI)-Israel was
founded in 1987 to promote and protect the rights of children,
as formulated in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
254
257

id.
Id.
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Child, and to empower children to recognize and act on their
rights. DCI attorneys provide information, legal advice, and
representation to children in need at Children's Rights
Information Centers throughout Israel. 258
DCI outreach
workers lead seminars, lectures, and workshops for youth in
schools, day care centers,
and community centers on a range of
2 59
children's rights topics.
Yonatan Vingerten works as a consultant attorney for
DCI. He works on both civil and criminal cases. He is also
involved with a children's center for
kids in danger, helping to
2 60
prevent problems before they arise.
Although Mr. Vingerten is morally against the corporal
punishment of children, he does not believe that this is
something that can be legally prohibited. He thus finds the
Supreme Court's Plonil decision too extreme. He criticizes the
Court for not treating "a delicate issue with sensitivity."
Although the corporal punishment of children should be
prevented, criminal prosecution should not be invoked so
quickly.
Vingerten considers the criminal prosecution of
parents for lights slaps for educational purposes to be a mistake,
"even if this corporal punishment takes place out of parental
weakness and loss of control." Vingerten explains that "m6st
parents give their children a slap or two every so often," and he
fears that if they are brought to trial for this, they will feel as if
they have engaged in a criminal act, and this could deter parents
from educating their children. The interference of the law
would thus have "a negative effect on family relations and on
the parental function of raising children." 26 1
Therefore,
although still morally reprehensible, "in cases where a child is

258
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and Ashdod.
259 Web page for the Defense for Children International, at
http://www.defence-for-children.org (last visited Apr. 25, 2003).
260 Interview with Yonatan Vingerten, Attorney, Defense for Children
International, in Israel (Feb. 10, 2002).
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only hit once
in a very long while," the criminal law should not
262
interfere.
Interestingly, although Vingerten's tone and perspective
differ, his core ideas actually correspond with those of Tali Gal
of NCC and with the Plonit decision itself Mr. Vingerten, Tali
Gal, and the Supreme Court all agree that criminal sanctions are
inappropriate in cases of light, non-recurring corporal
punishment, although Tali Gal and the Supreme Court believe
that this minor and sporadic corporal punishment should be
legally forbidden. Vingerten, furthermore, declares that no
matter how light the corporal punishment, if it is recurring and
used as "a method of educating children," then it is problematic
and the law should intervene. 26 3 This coincides with Tali Gal's
spectrum of abuse and physical punishment with the Plonit
decision targeting systematic corporal punishment. The Plonit
decision itself holds that "parental use of corporal punishment
or means that humiliate and debase the child as an educational
method is now prohibited in our society." 264 This wording
indicates that the Court is chiefly concerned with the use of
corporal punishment specifically as an educational method.
Like Tali Gal, Vingerten points to a gap between the
opinions of child care experts and the public with regards to
corporal punishment. He remarks that psychologists, social
workers, and childcare workers are very much in favor of the
decision, but their views do not reflect that of the majority of
the Israeli public. He explains that childcare workers are
"unusually tolerant and patient people. 265
Vingerten does not foresee the decision as having a
major effect. He explains that most parents have already
forgotten about the decision and that it has wrought "no real
change" in the norms 266
of society, and in fact, violence and child
abuse have only risen.
26 2
263

id.
id

264Cr.A.
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This is the case because subjecting parents to criminal
penalties will not uproot corporal punishment, and dealing with
the causes of corporal punishment is more a job for social
workers. Vingerten thus suggests the mandatory involvement
of social workers, and making the prohibition on corporal
punishment a moral imperative for parents and not a legal
obligation. The problem is that "the need and demand for social
the supply," and government
workers in Israel exceeds
267
insufficient.
are
resources
Child protection laws themselves are only weakly
enforced. Great improvement in the Israeli laws protecting
children took place in the last eight years; these advances are
reflected both in the law's treatment of children as perpetrators
and as victims of crimes. Although there is still room for
However,
improvement, the laws are generally good.
into
enforcement lacks funding and manpower. Israel's division268
difficult.
more
enforcement
makes
also
populations
various
The economic situation of the country affects not only
the government's provision of services, but also the dynamics
within families. Poor families that depend on the father's
financial support for existence will not rush to file a complaint
against him. In these cases, "children's rights are not a
priority.,269
In terms of preventing abuse, Vingerten advocates a
shift in focus from parents to children. Increasing sanctions on
abusive parents does not really serve as a deterrent, since a
parent who loses control will not be thinking about the law and
criminal penalties. In fact, Mr. Vingerten believes that there is
no effective deterrence. Thus, energy needs to be invested in
the children that were hit since "most parents that engage 27in0
corporal punishment were children that were hit themselves.
Abused children are likely to become abusive parents. Since it
is difficult to change parents, the emphasis needs to be on
267

Id.

269 id.
269 id.
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"the spread of violence from one
children and on preventing
27
generation-to the next." '
Despite differences in the use of corporal punishment
among the different groups of the Israeli population, Vingerten,
like Tall Gal, believes that all groups must be treated equally.
The decision has to be "universal." Even if immigrant parents
may have come from cultures where severe corporal
punishment is accepted and encouraged, they must modify their
behavior and adjust to the norms of a new society. The
Supreme Court sets the norms for the entire society. Thus, even
while disagreeing with the Plonit decision, Vingerten accepts
the Supreme Court as a moral force - a "moral compass for the
He concedes that perhaps "a measure of
society. 272
forgiveness" can be exercised towards immigrant parents in the
type of legal sanctions imposed, but "at least in principle, all
groups must
be treated equally and held up to the same
273
standards."
3. Hirsch Early
Center

Childhood .Development

Established in 1995, the Hirsch Early Childhood
Development Center provides medical, psychological, and
educational services to Arab and Jewish families and educators
in Jaffa.
Activities include mother and child care clinical
services, family consulting, early childhood enrichment
programs, occupational therapy, and parenting programs.
Workshops teach parents and educators about the
developmental needs of children, positive child-rearing
practices, and specific parenting skills. Jewish and Arab
professionals facilitate these workshops, and groups meet for
one hour per week for six months. Usually, parents come to the
center because they do not have the tools to deal with their
271 Id.
272 id.
273 id.
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children, but the center also goes out to274kindergartens in Jaffa
and recruits parents to join the program.
Mary Copti is a social worker at the Hirsch Early
Childhood Development Center.
She manages treatment
subjects, serves as a family therapist, and conducts parenting
groups. Besides her work with Hirsch, she is a principal of an
Arab Orthodox school in Jaffa, currently with students from
kindergarten to 4th grade, but with plans to expand to the 12th
grade.
Every year, Ms. Copti leads two groups of about twelve
families per group. Usually just mothers participate in the
group, but she is now working with couples. Copti used to run
separate groups for Arab and Jewish parents, but she is
currently running a joint session. Separate and joint groups
each have their advantages and disadvantages. In separate
sessions, it is possible to work on the problems and difficulties
specific to each group. However, working jointly enables
holding "enli ghtening discussions on modernization and
democracy."
Surprisingly, Copti and the Hirsch Center were unaware
of the Plonit decision, indicating that this decision has not yet
penetrated local organizations at the ground level that work
directly with families on parenting techniques. 277

Copti,

however, is fully supportive of the Plonit decision. She
maintains that a healthy environment will "prevent a situation
from arising where there is any need to resort to hitting and
corporal punishment." 278 She rejects corporal punishment and,
in fact, punishment at all per se, claiming that punishment will
only lead to vengeful feelings and a battle to see who is

274 Interview with Mary Copti, Social Worker with Hirsch Early Childhood
Development
Center, in Israel (Feb. 5, 2002).
273
id.

276 Id.

277 The second consulting attorney with DCI, besides Yonatan Vingerten, to

whom I was referred was also unaware of the Plonil decision.
278 Mary Copti interview, supra note 274.
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stronger. 279 It is much better for "the cost for the child to be
related to the child's bad behavior."2 ' This way, the children
will learn that they are not following arbitrary rules, but rather
that the bad behavior itself brings losses. Thus, punishment
should never
be in isolation, but rather be tied to the
28 1
behavior.
Copti explains that there are two kinds of parents:
initiative and reactive parents. Initiative parents set clear rules
They are assertive, yet
and goals for their children.
comprehending, when setting these rules. They plan their
actions and do not need to punish. When children behave
wrongly, "they let them correct their mistakes and lead them to
do so while maintaining a good atmosphere and warm, friendly
relationship." 282 There is a direct connection between the
child's misconduct and the result. On the other hand, reactive
parents do not plan their actions and react immediately and
spontaneously as soon as a child breaks a rule. They get angry
that the child broke a rule and punish the child proportionally to
their level of anger. There is usually no connection between the
child's misbehavior and the punishment. If the parents are
aggressive, they can even resort to corporal punishment. Thus,
Copti states, "I see that punishment shows the power of the
- the logical
punisher, while the alternative way of education
283
result way - shows the demands of reality.
IV. Reception
This part of the paper examines the reception of the
Plonit decision. It explores the debates around the corporal
punishment of children in Israel and the reaction to the decision
amongst both its supporters and detractors. There is a dialectic
279
290
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relationship between law and society.
Just as legal
developments shape the cultural discourse, the cultural
discourse, in turn, helps create the legal environment.
A. Child Specialists and Corporal Punishment
This section explores the attitude towards corporal
punishment by people specializing in children. It examines the
views of educators, psychologists, and social workers in Israel.
A review of the literature concerning children points to the gap
frequently cited between
the perspective of experts and that of
284
public.
the general
1. Reception of the Plonit Decision
For a long time, popular magazines on parenting
advocated refraining from corporal punishment, and they
embraced the Supreme Court's Plonit decision when it came
out. As discussed below, these magazines have rejected
corporal punishment as ineffective and harmful. Thus, Michael
Ben-Yair of Children: Journal on Education, Health, and
Security declared, "We should be grateful for the approach of
the Supreme Court in recent years. ' 285 Galit Levi-Samorai of
Parents and Children praised the Supreme Court opinion for
striking "a clear norm according to which a child is a human
284

Johnson, supra note 150, at 429 (stating that although social science

research indicates that the use of corporal punishment may not be in best

interests of child, it continues to find popular and legal support); Tali Gal
interview, supra note 243; Yonatan Vingerten interview, supranote 260;
The Plonit decision itself states, "In various articles recently published in the
United States, the authors remark on the gap between the legal approach,
frequently exhibiting tolerance towards reasonable corporal punishment

designated for educational purposes, and the approach of professionals in the
arenas of medicine, education and psychology, that do not perceive any
utility in it." Cr.A. 4596/98, Roe v. State of Israel, 54(l) P.D. 145, 170-71.
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Education of Children, CHILDREN: JOURNAL ON EDUCATION, HEALTH, AND

285

SECURITY,

2000, at 2 1.

OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

being in every instance; he has rights, and he is not the property
of his parents." 28 6 Acknowledging the gap between expert and
popular opinion towards corporal punishment, Galit LeviSamorai sees the Supreme Court as achieving balanced
moderation, where light cases remain at home since "the
Supreme Court desired to absorb a behavioral norm that unites
different strands of the Israeli population, a norm that gives
expression to the value of human dignity. 287
Judge
Strashnov's opinion, on the other hand, is criticized as "liable to
have dangerous implications on the growing phenomenon of
child abuse - it is liable to become accepted 288
or to be used by
parents as an excuse for hitting their children."
The reaction of child specialists to the Plonit decision
stems from their concept of the state and its role. Although
recognizing that parents are children's primary caretakers, they
do not excuse the public from responsibility for children's wellbeing. Government needs to set rules protecting children and
ensuring their human dignity. Thus, Michael Ben-Yair stated,
"We have the obligation to care for the well-being and life of
those that are not able to take care of themselves and to do
everything in order to enable children to grow
28 9 in an
environment of happiness, understanding, and love.,
2. Views on Corporal Punishment
Child specialists commonly deride corporal punishment
as ineffective. 29 For instance, Tova Nir, an educator at the
287

Levi-Samorai, supra note 72.
Id.

288

Shtiver, supra note 68.

289
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290 The rejection of corporal punishment by children's specialists is most

common, but not universal. For example, Naomi Baum, the child
psychologist and director of psychological services for the Gush Etzion
Regional Council frets, "What the court is doing is undermining to some
degree the authority of the parents in the family." Keinon, supra note 245.
Amos Rolider, (he chairman of the Behavioral Sciences Department of
Jezreel Valley College admits that "in principle I agree that physical
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Adler Institute and Educational Office for Parent Groups
declared, "Corporal punishment does not contribute a thing and
is not effective." 29' Yitzhak Kadman 292 of NCC explained:
We are in favor of limits, of parents and
teachers teaching what is good and bad. But
we. are saying not to do that with blows
because that humiliates and hurts the kid,
but does nothing to help him internalize the
message. The only thing that you learn from
a smack is to be afraid of the person who hit
you - you don't internalize
anything that
293
person is trying to teach.
This is the case since "[a] smack is easy and fast ...too easy. It
is much more difficult to have to sit down with children and
explain things to them ...It is a shortcut, but in education there

are no shortcuts." 294 "When we react with violence, we actually
stop [educating]. 295 In the case of babies, where people claim
they understand no other language but physical pain, Yitzhak
Kadman and Tamar Peleg-Amir respond, "if they do not
punishment is not good, and should be avoided," but he worries that "the
trend that the children have all the rights, and the adults are losing theirs, is
not necessarily a trend that is for the good of the child.. . We have to look
and see what is more dangerous- the fact that there are no parental limits,
something which can lead to violent and antisocial behavior on the part of
some kids, or the chance that the child will learn aggressive behavior
because his parents use.physical punishment."Id. Thus, it seems that even
the experts that oppose the Plonit decision do not do so because they believe
in the corporal punishment of children as a good thing in itself, but rather
because they fear parental loss of control without this tool.
29' Adi Yotam, Without Hitting, 133 PARENTS AND CHILDREN, 1999, at 48.
292 Besides heading the National Council for the Child, Dr. Yitzhak Kadman
has a PhD in Social Policy from Brandeis University, served as a social
worker dealing closely with children and families for many years, and was
formerly the head of Social Workers Association in Israel.
293 Keinon, supra note 245.
294
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understand the explanation, they certainly do not understand the
'
hit."296
Yafa HaOzer refers to many studies that show "that
extensive use of corporal punishment causes it to cease working
as a deterrence; after the child serves the punishment, he feels
free to return to the same behavior." 297 Thus, at best, corporal
punishment can prevent negative behavior only when the
authority figure is in the environment.298
Not only does corporal punishment fail to achieve its
aims, but child specialists find it destructive and "liable to make
a negative imprint on the life and behavior of the child, for all
his life. ' 299 As Michael Ben-Yair stated, "The view accepted
today by psychologists, educators, and social workers - the
view supported by much research is that [corporal] punishment
causes pain and humiliation in children; it is an action that is
harmful, negative, and unwanted ...

[i]nstead of encouraging

self-discipline in the child, the violation humiliates the child and
his dignity, and it is liable to lead to the development of a sense
of humiliation, low self esteem, and feelings of heightened
dread and anger." 300 A Parentsand Childreneditorial explains
that people who grow up in homes where the use of corporal
punishment is frequent for the imposition of discipline will be
three times as likely to become alcoholics or develop
depression. 30 1 Thus, parents who hit or slap their children from
302
time to time are not abusive parents, but they still cause harm.
Some child specialists go even further and point to the "close
303
connection between corporal punishment and child abuse."

296 PELEG-AMIR&KADMAN, supra note

249.

297 HaOzer, supra note 89, at 18.

29a Yotam, supra note 291, at 48 (quoting Dr. Chanita Tzimrin, President of
the Organization for the Protection of the Child).
299 Ben-Yair, supra note 285, at 20.
300 Id. at 21.

30' Report on Society, Behavior, Education, and Health in the Family, Spare
the Rod and Hate the Child, 25 PARENTS AND CHILDREN, 1990, at 12.
302 HaOzer, supra note 89, at 18.
303Miller, supra note 84, at 70.
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Another problem with the corporal punishment of
children is that children learn by imitating. As Yitzhak Kadman
explained,
Most of the learning is done from
mimicking the behavior of the significant
adults in [the child's] life. . [j]ust as it is
impossible to lecture against smoking while
having a cigarette dangling from your
mouth, so too it is impossible for a parent to
educate against 'Violence when it is used in
the home.
One thing contradicts the
3 4
other.
Dr. Kaisar, the director of child and adolescent psychiatric
services at the Tel Aviv Medical Center, echoed that sentiment,
saying, "Corporal punishment humiliates the child and causes
him to internalize the violence and to make it a permanent
behavioral model. ' 30 5 Corporal punishment shows the child
that the world is divided into the strong and the weak, and the
strong have the upper hand in the system. 306 Absorbing this
perspective, children hit by their parents, in turn, hit their
younger siblings. 30 7 This also puts in motion a cycle of
violence, where using force to impose one's will passes from
one generation to the next. As Michael Ben-Yair said, "The
304 Keinon, supra note 245.
3'0Efrat Milner et al., For the

Decision: The Decision Places Us amongst

the ProgressiveCountries, YEDI'Or AHARONOT, Jan. 26, 2000, at II; A
longitudinal study, led by Bigelow professor of education Kurt Fischer and
founded by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development,
tracked a representative sample of 440 children (aged between 7 and 13 at
the start of the study) for eight years to trace the antecedents of aggression.
The study found that the strongest predictors of aggression were physical
punishment by parents and inhibited temperament - much more so than
socioeconomic or demographic factors. Hair-Trigger Temperaments:
Inhibited Killers, HARVARD MAGAZINE, Sept.- Oct. 2002.
306
HaOzer, supra note 89, at 18.
307 Eden, supra note 83, at 7.
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child seeing in his parents and educators a model for copying is
liable to adopt as he matures the same violent behavior from
which he suffered as a child., 30 8 Numerous studies have shown
that corporal punishment teaches violent behavior across
generations, 309 and according to a December 1989 study by
Hebrew University,
80% of parents that hit were hit themselves
310
children.
as
Therefore, according to child specialists, corporal
punishment does more to serve the parents, enabling them
release tension, than it does to serve the child. Orit Shrig, a
clinical psychologist at the Triast-Shrig Institute for Family
Treatment explains that "oftentimes, punishment serves the
parent's need - an act of vengeance that does not stem from a
conscious thought. Punishment only releases the parent from an
unpleasant feeling and from frustration, but it is not helpful for
the education of the child." 311 Thus, corporal punishment is
usually not planned ahead or tied to the child's behavior, but
rather linked to the parents' anger, frustration, lack of patience,
and helplessness. 312 However, all agree.that a small child is not
a suitable object for the release of tension, 31 3 and even if the
"educational hits" are accepted, Levi Eden makes the point that
it is very hard to differentiate "hits in anger" from "educational
hits" - a distinction no longer relevant after the Plonit
decision.314
Child specialists thus perceive corporal punishment not
as a sign of parental control, but rather of loss of control. As
Tova Nir from the Adler Institute and Educational Office for
308 Ben-Yair, supra note 285, at 21.
309 YITZHAK KADMAN& MIRIAM GALIT, WITHOUT VIOLENCE: GUIDE FOR
PARENTS I (National Council for the Child); HaOzer, supra note 89, at 18;

Eden, supra note 83, at 8.
310 Eden, supra note 83, at 7.
311 Riba Ben-Ner, "Is it Permittedto Spank?" 72
(1994).
3 12
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Parent Groups explained, "All the experts who write on the
subject agree that severe corporal punishment is completely
forbidden ... And, according to their words, hitting is not an
educational tool, but rather just the expression of the parent's
loss of control and anger." 3 1 Yitzhak Kadman agreed that "[in
most cases, hitting children is a result of loss of control and
thought., 31 6 As he explained most parents who hit their
children occasionally admit it was done when they "lost
control" and "not after they sat down and thought out whether it
was the best way to get a particular message across .... ,5311
Likewise, Adi Yotam writes that we punish our children when
we lose control - "a different situation, a different mood, and
we could resolve every problem with humor, words, and
explanation." 3 18
Furthermore, not only does corporal
punishment stem from weakness, but "the use of physical
power
31 9
does not return control and authority to the parents."
Paradoxically, at the same time that engaging in corporal
punishment may help parents release anger and frustration, it
also leads to feelings of pain and regret. Yofa HaOzer recounts
that most parents who hit from time to time say that giving even
the lightest hit causes in them "an oppressive weight and
feelings of guilt and frustration." 320 Tova Nir seconds that
parents that hit usually feel angry with themselves, but they do

31 Yotam, supranote 291, at 48.
Levi-Samorai, supra note 72.
317 Keinon, supra note 245. In Judge Strashnov's case, the father who
kicked his son recounted, "He runs wild and shames me. They complain
about him at school, the neighbors complain about him ... I have only
trouble from him. I feel I am helpless with this boy." The father's words are
more a cry for help, admitting to feelings of powerlessness and a loss of
control, than an explanation for his use of violence. Cr.C. (T.A.) 570/91,
State of Israel v. Ploni, 52(I) P.M. 431, 434.
318 Yotam, supra note 291, at 48.
319 HaOzer, supra note 89, at 18.
320 id.
316
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not think they have a choice. 321 Thus,
hitting is painful to both
32 2
parents.
the
and
sides - the children
Even the staunchest supporters of corporal punishment
recognize the need for limitations and do not consider it an
absolute good. Parents firmly believing in corporal punishment
restrict its use to "reasonable hits" and "educational hits," given
not "in time of anger" and "not when children are incapable of
differentiating between 'reasonable, educational hits' and
ordinary hitting." 323 Furthermore, as pointed out by Yitzhak
Kadman, even while defending their own right to use corporal
punishment, most parents would react sharply if a stranger,
including a teacher, hits their child or otherwise causes the child
physical pain. 324 Additionally, these same people would
condemn the corporal
punishment of misbehaving or even
325
criminal adults.

Child specialists question the logical, moral, and social
validity of the corporal punishment of children. They ask, if the
education of an older child is more difficult than that of a young
child who is helpless and lacking in physical strength - why is
there less use of force on adolescents? Is it perhaps because the
parents fear the adolescent's reaction? 326 And, why is it that we
make an effort to control ourselves and do not hit adults, while
this is not the case in our interaction with children? 327 What is
"reasonable" punishment anyway when the one that hits is an
adult and the one being hit is a small child?3 28

How is it

possible to give legitimacy at all to a violent connection
between parents and children? 329 Yitzhak Kadman maintains
that hitting children can only be supported under the approach
321 Yotam, supra note 291, at 52.
322 Tali Ben-Sira, It Hurts us Too, 79 PARENTS AND CHILDREN,
32-1Eden, supra note 83, at 8.
324 KADMAN & GALIT, supra note 312.

1994, at 17.

125HaOzer, supra note 89, at 18.

Eden, supra note 83, at 8.
Yotam, supra note 291, at 48.
328 Eden, supra note 83, at 7.
329 Yafa HaOzer, It is Forbidden to Hit Children. Period, 49 PARENTS AND
CHILDREN 6 (1992).
326
327
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that "it is only a child and not a human being yet." 33 Finally, if
we believe that violence is "a grave and unwanted phenomenon
in our1 society," how can we "find an objective justification for
33
it,?
3. Alternate Ways of Educating Children
While rejecting the use of corporal punishment, child
specialists promote other ways of disciplining and educating
children. Echoing the words of Mary Copti from the Hirsch
Early Childhood Development Center, they emphasize the
necessity of clarity in rules and relations and of a logical
connection between the child's misbehavior and the
consequences. Dorit Tamari, a psychologist and educator,
speaks of the importance of clearly defining "the unwanted
behavior and the punishment it will bring." 332 Yitzhak Kadman
and Miriam Galit similarly write of the child's need for a "set
framework and clear rules." 333 Tamari supports the use of
negative enforcement, or the prevention of enjoyment, stating
that "research shows that negative enforcement is more
effective than painful punishment," and that "negative
enforcement teaches about the connection between behavior and
consequences." 334 Daniella Yeshuron, an educational adviser
and manager at the Adler Institute, likewise stresses the
importance of "the connection between the action of the child
and the reaction." 335 This is the case since "when a child learns
that there is a logical consequence to his action, it will be easier
for him to do what is asked of him." 336 Kadman and Galit
affirm that parents are allowed to discipline and set clear
boundaries for their children, and they are allowed to use
reward and non-corporal punishment in educating them as long
330
331

332

HaOzer, supra note 89, at 20.
id.

Ben-Ner, supra note 31 I.

313KADMAN & GALIT, supra note 312.
334Ben-Ner, supra note 31 I, at 38.
335HaOzer, supra note 89, at 18.
336 Id. at 20.
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as the punishment "is the logical result of the child's
behavior." 337 "If the goal of punishment is to teach a child how
to behave, punishment needs to relate to the negative behavior
of the child and needs to be logical and rational."
Child specialists also speak of the need to use positive
enforcement. Riba Ben-Ner's article argues that for younger
children, who do not understand the meaning of punishment, it
is best to set up positive stimulations, along with
prohibitions.33 9 According to Tova Nir of the Adler Institute,
and kind words is "real
teaching through positive enforcement
340
learning and for the long run."
4. Studies Relied On
Studies generally tend to show that the corporal
punishment of children is ineffective and even detrimental.34'
Child specialists discount the studies that hold otherwise as
insignificant. NCC's Tali Gal scoffs that they show that
corporal punishment is not harmful if it takes place rarely, is not
- "in short,
too severe, and meets a host of other conditions
3 42
practically stops being corporal punishment."
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. Ben-Ner, supra note 3 1I.
340 Yotam, supra note 29 1, at 48.
341 See, eg., Murray A. Straus, Beating the Devil out of Them: Corporal
Punishment in American Families and Its Effect on Children 12 (1994); The
submission of the British Psychological Society to the Scottish Law
Commission, labeled the corporal punishment of children "an inefficient
method of modifying behaviour, being situation-specific and of short-term
effect, and with a possibility of undesirable side effects of both fear and
learned imitative behavior. More socially desirable attitudes would be
encouraged by alternative methods of managing behaviour, such as the
withdrawing of privileges and the rewarding of more desirable alternatives."
BARTON & DOUGLAS, supra note 123, at 153 (citing Scot Law Com., No.
135 Report on Family Law, at para. 2.73 (1992)).
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In rejecting corporal punishment, child specialists in
Israel principally rely on American studies. 343 However, as
Yonatan Vingerten of Defense for Children International points
out, there may be some important differences between
American society and Israeli society. According to Vingerten,
the Israeli reality is rougher, with daily tension, violence, and
terrorism, while the reality in the United States is more
"civilized and sterile." 344 Israel's Supreme Court itself relies
exclusively on American studies. Nevertheless, it recognizes
the violence in Israeli society as even more of a reason to
prohibit corporal punishment. It quotes Knesset Member Yael
Dayan, who describes "our society, where there is violence
against children, where there is violence against the weak,
where there is violence against incompetents, where there is
violence in the power of authority, also within the family, and
principally within the family" and declares, "We must also take
into account that we are living in a society where violence is
spreading like a plague; a permit for 'minor'
violence is likely
345
to deteriorate into very serious violence."
One Israeli study was published by Hebrew University
in December 1989. This study, undertaken by a team of
researchers from the university and from the Jerusalem Center
for the Development of the Child, follows 29 children that were
directed to the Center from ages two to four. It shows that the
hitting and severe neglect of children at a tender age causes a
high risk of 4aps in child development and may affect the rest
of their lives.9 F
B. Concerns Raised by the Plonit Decision
This section explores some of the public concerns raised
by the Plonit decision. Material is drawn from both newspaper
343 Tali Gal interview, supra note 243; Yonaton Vingerten interview, supra
note 260.
344 Yonaton Vingerten interview, supra note 260.
141 Cr.A. 4596/98, Roe v. State of Israel, 54(l) P.D. 145, 18 1.
346 Eden, supra note 83, at 7.
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articles and internet sources. It is important to interpret the
reaction to the Plonit decision against the background of the
incidence of corporal punishment in Israeli homes. NCC
published the results of a survey based on a state-wide
representative sample of 502 men and women from ages 18 and
up. About a quarter of the participants (24.3%) admitted that it
was customary in their homes to use corporal punishment
against children. About 44% of the participants responded that
in their childhood, their parents used to punish them
corporally. 347 Thus, the use of corporal punishment appears to.
be declining, but it remains widespread.
The Plonil decision was challenged both for systemic
reasons and for its wisdom. The Court was first accused of
overstepping its bounds and intruding into the family. Some
parents saw the decision as a direct threat to their autonomy
since "[t]he right to educate one's children according to one's
own understanding is among the most precious rights that a free
society grants its members." 348
Naomi Baum, a child
psychologist and the director of psychological services for Gush
Etzion Regional Council, complained, "What the court is doing
is undermining to some degree the authority of the parents in
the family." 349 Jonathan Rosenblum took this a step further,
expressing the fear that "[sloon we'll be told that the only
protection for our children is that they be raised by the
benevolent state . . ,, 350 This fear loses credibility, however,
.147 HaOzer, supra note 89, at 18. According to the NCC survey, 75%
of

Israeli parents acknowledge using force against their children at least once.
Tzimuki, supra note 90, at 2. According to a Yedi'ot Aharonot survey, 47%
of Jewish Israelis believe that it is appropriate for parents to lightly hit their
child for educational purposes. The survey interviewed 100 people statewide over the age of 18. Yedi'ot Aharonot survey, YEOIOr AHARONOT, Jan.

2, 2000, at 7.
34' Evelyn Gordon, The Supreme Court in Loco Parentis, AZURE, Winter
5761/2000, available at http://www.shalom.org.il/azure/I 0-gordon.htm (last

visited Apr. 25, 2003).
349 Keinon, supra note 245.
Js0 Jonathan Rosenblum, Who Needs Parents, Anyway?, JERUSALEM POST,
Feb. 4, 2000.
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when taking into account that the state alieady actively
participates in shaping family relations, and even the most
vigorous opponents of the Plonit decision do not advocate
giving parents absolute control over children.
The Israeli Supreme Court has also been accused of
usurping legislative functions and of dangerous countermajoritarianism in the Plonit decision. Knesset Member Rabbi
Gafni, who submitted a bill to counter the Court's ruling which
was subsequently defeated, perceived the decision as "opening
the door to judicial dictatorship," criticizing the Court for its
"dangerous arrogance." 351 Jonathan Rosenblum mocked, "Our
Supreme Court has once again experienced an infusion of the
god-like wisdom to which it is periodically subject."3'52 This
conveys a notion of the Supreme Court as a dictatorial voice
determining policies from above. He then went on to ask
"[w]hy the court - and not the Knesset, which has the ability to
conduct extensive hearings and which more closely reflects the
values of Israel's citizens - should be the body to establish these
norms." 353 He concluded that "[c]hild raising is too important
a subject to be confined to the pronouncements of three justices
with no self-evident qualifications in the area." 354 Evelyn
Gordon is indignant that "[w]ith supreme arrogance, a panel of
three people ... decided that it knows better than the majority
what 'is forbidden today in our society."' 355 She made this
criticism part of a general critique of the Supreme Court,
protesting that "this is hardly the first time the court has
ruthlessly rewritten Israel's legal system to suit its own
'enlightened' values," and "the fact that a majority of the
country might disagree has never stopped the court from

35 Rabbi Moshe Gafni, Is it Reasonable or Desirable to Outlaw the Use of

Corporal Punishment by Parents? THE JERUSALEM POST, May 8, 2000.
352

Rosenblum, supra note 350.

353id.

354 Jonathan Rosenblum, Child Rearing is Too Importantfor the Courts,
JERUSALEM PosTr, Feb. 10, 2000.
355 Evelyn Gordon, Supreme Arrogance, JERUSALEM

POST, Feb. I, 2000.
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356
declaring itself the sole arbiter of -society's values."
However, Gordon herself conceded that "[t]he ruling did
produce a . . . debate on the pros and cons of spanking one's
child, but there was virtually no discussion of the court's right
to issue such a verdict. '357 Thus, while Israelis hotly debated
the decision's implications for child raising, they generally
accepted the Supreme Court's norm-setting role for society.
The third systemic issue raised with regards to the Plonit
decision centers on its enforceability. As Barak Barfi said, "It
will be very difficult to enforce the ruling." 358 Even worse is
the fear that Plonit's unenforceable standard will open "the way
for arbitrary and unequal applications of the law. Social
workers, for instance, will now have a tool with which they can
institute proceedings to remove virtually any child they want
from his home." 359 The Court took pains to assure that de
minimis cases will not be pursued, but its critics find this far
from reassuring. As Motti Scherzer, the chairman of Education
Counselors explained, "When even the court's supporters claim
that a ruling it has issued is not meant to be implemented, its
status as a legal authority is in trouble." 360 Thus, paradoxically,
according to Plonii's opponents, while the Court is
aggrandizing its power, it is at the same time threatening the
very basis of its authority. Evelyn Gordon warned, "[lI]ssuing a
decree 'that the public will not be able to abide by' is a sure
way to breed disrespect for the law and most especially for the
court itself., 36 1 But, does this logic also apply to de minimis
assaults against adults, which are also legally prohibited?
Some parents took the decision as a personal attack
against their policies and status as parents. Evelyn Gordon
sharply criticized the Court for issuing a "ruling, based on the

id.
33'Gordon, supra note 348.
358 Barak Barfi, IsraeliSupreme Court Bans ParentalForce, ASSOCIArED
PRESS, Jan. 27, 2000.
356
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flimsiest legal premises, which declared the overwhelming
majority of Israeli adults to be criminals." 362 She lamented, "A
large number of Israelis are probably criminals now - even
though they weren't a few weeks ago." 363 And, she warned
parents dramatically, "you'll never know when the knife might
descend .3

To claims that corporal punishment is harmful to

children, parents defensively point to their own upbringing,
asserting that corporal punishment did not hurt them. Yafa
Ha'Ozer quoted this common refrain: "I was also slapped, and
nothing happened to me. I didn't feel a miserable and beaten
child. On the contrary,365I learned that if I do something bad, I
deserve a punishment"
These parents are most uncomfortable by the connection
drawn by corporal punishment and abuse in the decision.
Jonathan Rosenblum maintains that "Beinisch's entire argument
against any physical punishment was that anyone who spanks
their child even once may become a child abuser .

.

.. She

assumes, without support, that every parental spanking is366
a
microcosm of what child abusers do on a continuous basis."
He is quick to reassure that "[t]he means, intent, and
psychological makeup of the child-abuser bear no relation to
those of a normal parent who occasionally spanks a child. 367
Parents also oppose the decision out of the fear that
without corporal punishment they are liable to lose control over
their children. Knesset Member Rabbi Gafni fears that the
Court's "intervention could twist the personalities of the
children, causing them to rebel against their parents and cast off
'36
the yoke of education," leading to "educational anarchy. S
362 Gordon, supra note 348.
363 Evelyn Gordon, Court Shows Supreme Arrogance in Ban on Spanking,
JEWISH BULLETIN OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA: EDITORIAL & OPINION,

February 25, 2000, at http://www.jewishsf.com/bkO00225/commi.shtml (last
visited Apr. 25, 2003).
3'4 Gordon, supra note 355.
365 HaOzer, supra note 89, at 18.
366 Rosenblum, supra note 354.
36 7
Id
368 Gafni, supra note 35 1.
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Amos Rolider, the chairman of the Behavioral Sciences
Department of Jezreel Valley College worries that:
[tihe trend that the children have all the
rights, and the adults are losing theirs, is not
necessarily a trend that is for the good of the
child .... We have to look and see what is

more dangerous - the fact that there are no
parental limits, something which can lead to
violent and antisocial behavior on the part of
some kids, or the chance that the child will
his
learn aggressive behavior because
369
parents use physical punishment.
However, he goes on to say, "In principle I agree that physical
punishment is not good, and should be avoided. That is good
common sense ....But at the same time, we need punishments

for educational purposes. ' 370 He thus concedes that corporal.
punishment is not ideal, but fears that there is no alternative.
Shimon Kahn, who teaches 22 three-year-olds in a Jerusalem
preschool, addresses this point. "If we are taking this right
away, maybe we need to provide workshops for parents on how
to discipline. Maybe every parent who registers their child in
be
an Education Ministry preschool should, once or twice,
37
required to come to an hour-long workshop on discipline." '
Not all of the decision's critics even accept the Court's
fundamental assumption that violence is an absolute evil that
needs to be eradicated from society. One of the decision's
antagonists argued that violence - used in proportion and in
proper circumstances - is good and necessary. 7 2 Going back to
the Holocaust, he queried, "[DJon't we all cringe because
several million Jews went to the gas chambers without putting
Keinon, supra note 245.

369
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up a struggle? Maybe their violent resistance might not have
changed their fate, but it would have made us feel a bit prouder.
Violence has its uses." 373 He praised the virtues of spanking,

claiming with tongue and cheek that it could even benefit some
adults. He wrote, "The problem is that parents often need the
spanking more than their child. And this goes for all too many
of our politicians, our policemen, our teachers, our doctors, our
bus drivers, our rabbis ...

and yes, with all due respect, Their

374
Honors, our Supreme Court Justices."
Reaction to the decision is further complicated by
religious considerations. Judge Strashnov of the Tel Aviv
District Court based his support of corporal punishment on
Biblical and rabbinical citations. 375 Proponents of corporal
punishment commonly
,,376 cite the proverb, "He who spares the
rod, hates his child.
The Talmud and later commentaries
also seem to justify corporal punishment. 377 Chaim Budnick
explained that "in the correct circumstances and within the
correct boundaries, corporal punishment is not only condoned
but rather prescribed." 78 Thus, Jonathan Rosenblum wrote,
"Most religious Jews would likely be numbered among the
skeptics when it comes to the absolutist position against any
physical punishment. 3 79 However, even among the religious,
views are not unanimous. Rabbi Israel Meir Lau points out that

the Hebrew word for rod, shevet, not only means rod, but it is
373
374Id.

373Miller, supra note 84, at 70.
376Proverbs 13:24 (Hebrew Bible).

377It is interesting to note that Rabbinic sources seem to support not just the

hitting of children by parents, but also the hitting of wives by husbands.
Avirma Golan, To Hit in an Educational Way, MUSAF L.A., Feb. 22, 2002,
at 24 (discussing the doctoral dissertation of Michal Wolf.
318Chaim

Budnick, The Fifth Shulchan Aruch, Letter to JF.RUSAI.EM POST,

Feb. 3, 2000.
3" Rosenblum, supra note 350. According to the Yedi'ot Aharonot survey,
amongst the religious, there exists a broader consensus that it is appropriate
to use light corporal punishment on a child. Yedi'o Aharonot survey,
YEDIOT AHARONOT, Jan. 2, 2000, at 7; Tzimuki, supra note 90, at 2.
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also used in the Bible to denote authority and fear. 8 ° Frimet
Roth argues that since the second half of the quoted proverb is
"But he who loves him reproves him early" with no mention of
a rod or hitting, this supports the view that King Solomon was
parents to teach and discipline their
merely 38
exhorting
1
children.
V. Conclusion

Placing the Plonit decision in proper context deradicalizes it and makes it more understandable. Although the
decision represents a break with common law tradition, it is

possible to see how it follows from legal developments
internationally and in Israel. In January 2000, Israel became the
tenth in a string of countries rejecting the corporal punishment
of children. 38 2 Soon after Israel's Plonit decision, Germany
passed an amendment to the Civil Code, stating, "Children have
the right to a non-violent upbringing. Corporal punishment,
psychological injuries and other humiliating measures are
prohibited. 383 Even the common law countries have taken
steps towards the elimination of corporal punishment. In 1986,
the United Kingdom became the last country in Europe to
abolish corporal punishment in state-supported schools. 384 Over
half of the American states prohibit the use of corporal
punishment in public schools,
and certain state regulations
prohibit foster parents from using corporal punishment. 386 In
Israel, starting in 1993, lower court opinions had already
3o Keinon, supra note 245.
381 Roth,

supra note 50.

382 EPOCH-WORLDWIDE, LEGAL REFORMS: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF
CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY.

383 EPOCH-WORLDWI DE, LEGAL REFORMS: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF

CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY 4.
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rejected corporal punishment.3" 7 In 1998, in Sde-Or, the
Supreme Court of Israel held that "the use of violence by an
cannot be viewed as
his students
educator towards
388
reasonable."
It is still premature to properly evaluate enforcement of
the Plonit decision. The decision is starting to shape legal
doctrine and has been cited as precedent. However, lower court
reactions vary from support for the norm-setting function of the
Supreme Court and realization of the gravity of violence
towards children to confusion and discomfort with the decision.
389 Some judges have avoided decisively stating that corporal
punishment is impermissible and have chosen to decide cases
on narrower grounds. 390 As perhaps to be expected, in terms of
government enforcement agencies, there has as yet not been
much of a response to the decision. The National Council for
the Child, Israel's major children's rights organization, seems to
be making the dissemination of information on the Plonit
decision one of its priorities. It produced a pamphlet explaining
the decision to the public and responding to commonly raised
concerns. It is also gearing up for a public education campaign,
including visits to schools all over Israel. 39 1' Events in the
Scandinavian countries, such as Sweden and Finland,
demonstrate that a legal prohibition can affect the norms and
392
behavior of the citizens even with light enforcement.
However, in these countries, the legal change was backed by the
pouring of government energy and money into educating the
public through mailings, public school programs, parental
The
education seminars, and a massive media campaign.
question is whether this can happen in Israel. Causing an initial
38' HaOzer, supra note 89, at 20; Cr.A. (B.S.) 1059/96.
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splash in the media, the decision has already contributed to the
consciousness-raising of Israelis. Nonetheless, memories are
short, and the decision has still not penetrated to smaller
working directly with families on
organizations on the ground,
94
parenting techniques.
The decision's reception has been mixed. Children's
specialists overwhelmingly welcomed it, 395 though some
stressed that parents need to be taught alternative tools for
dealing with children. 396 Children's specialists in Israel have
been agitating for a prohibition on corporal punishment for a
long time, advocating
for it in parenting magazines and
3(7
Knesset.
the
lobbying
Public concerns raised by the decision range from the
systemic to challenges to the decision's wisdom. Religious
issues also factored into this explosive mix with frequent
reference to the proverb, "He who spares the rod, hates his
child," and the Talmud and later commentaries seeming to
justify corporal punishment. The decision raised important
questions about the democratic legitimacy of the Court's
decisions, the norm-setting function of law, and the role of
government in regulating family relations. People used the
decision as a means to criticize the Supreme Court's policies
and role in government in general. However, as even some of
the decision's detractors concede, 398 the Israeli public generally
accepts the norm-setting function of the Court and perceives the
Court as a "moral compass for the society.,, 399 Debate thus
centered mainly on the practicability and intelligence of the
decision. Even amongst those who feel the decision went too
far, however, there is widespread agreement that corporal
Mary Copti interview, supra note 274.
393 Ben-Yair, supra note 285, at 21; Izenberg, supra note 244; Levi-Samorai,
supra note 72.
396 Keinon, supra note 245.
39' Ben-Yair, supra note 285, at 20; Ilaszer, supranote 89, at 18, 20; LeviSamorai, supra note 72; Miller, supra note 84, at 69; Yotam, supra note 291,
394
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punishment - no matter how light - used systematically and as
is problematic. 40°

a regular educational method by parents
Thus, only time will tell what impact the decision will
have on the behavior of Israeli parents. Much of this will
depend on efforts at education and the dissemination of
information. Parents need to be given alternative disciplinary
tools, and emphasis needs to be placed on reaching the next
generation.
But, significantly, the decision is part of a
movement away from corporal punishment in Israel, and there
is a certain public consensus on which to build. I would like to
close with the words of Alice Miller: "We are still barely
conscious of how harmful it is to treat children in a degrading
manner .

. .

. We don't yet know, above all, what the world

might be like if children were to grow up without being
subjected to humiliation, ifyparents would respect them and take
them seriously as persons."

'00 Keinon, supra note 245; STRASHNOV, supra note 85; Yonatan Vingerten
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